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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(a) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide this appeal 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
L Did the trial court err in finding that Appellee proved the second element of 
his boundary by acquiescence claim, "mutual acquiescence," when the 
boundary line was disputed and Appellant Sterling Jones did not "recognize" 
or accept the line, but instead agreed to ascertain the correct boundary line? 
Standard of Review: The determination by a trial court that a party has proved the 
elements of its boundary by acquiescence claim is a conclusion of law which is 
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 
96 P.3d 935; Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). However, such a 
determination is highly fact sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of 
discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah 
App. 1999). 
Issue Preserved at: [R. 190:13-19]. 1 [R. 341:2 through 342:1] [Amended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, attached hereto as Addendum 
" 1 , " p. 3, If 10]. [Rule 52 (b) Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Judgment on 
January 12, 2004, attached hereto as Addendum "2," pp. 3-5]. . [July 25, 2003 
Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as Addendum "3," p. 4, f^ 12]. 
1 Hereinafter, all citations to the trial transcript shall be designated [R. : ] indicating 
page number and line number separated by a colon. 
D „ ^ 1 ^ f $1 
Did the trial court err in finding that Appellee proved "mutual acquiescence" 
when the fence-line that was claimed by Appellee to mark a boundary was 
merely part of the Appellants' horse-corral and was constructed as an 
enclosure for Appellants' horses and was not intended to demarcate a 
boundary line? 
Standard of Review: The determination by a trial court that a party has proved the 
elements of its boundary by acquiescence claim is a conclusion of law which is 
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 
96 P.3d 935; Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). However, such a 
determination is highly fact sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of 
discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah 
App. 1999). 
Issue Preserved at: [R. 190:12-24]. [Ruling on Defendants'Objection, attached 
hereto as Addendum "4," p. 3]. [Addendum "2," pp. 6-7]. 
Did the trial court err in finding that Appellee proved the second element of 
his boundary by acquiescence claim, "mutual acquiescence," when, in fact, 
Appellants became aware of the "true" boundaries of the disputed property 
after purchasing the disputed property in 1961? 
Standard of Review: The determination by a trial court that a party has proved the 
elements of its boundary by acquiescence claim is a conclusion of law which is 
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard RHN Corp. v. VeibelU 2004 UT 60, 
96 P.3d 935; Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). However, such a 
determination is highly fact sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of 
discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah 
App. 1999). 
Issue Preserved at: [R. 193:21-24]. [Addendum "2," pp. 6-7]. [Addendum "3," p. 
13]. 
Did the trial court err in granting to Appellee an entire parcel of property by 
essentially converting Appellee's boundary by acquiescence claim into an 
adverse possession claim, which allowed Appellee to avoid the property tax 
requirement? 
Standard of Review: The determination by a trial court that a party has proved the 
elements of its boundary by acquiescence claim is a conclusion of law which is 
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 
96 P.3d 935; Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). However, such a 
determination is highly fact sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of 
discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah 
App. 1999). 
Issue Preserved at: [R. 348:2-6]. [Addendum "3," p. 15, footnote 9]. 
Did the trial court err in finding that Appellee proved the second element of 
his boundary by acquiescence claim, "mutual acquiescence," when 
Appellants also made some use of the disputed property? 
Standard of Review: The determination by a trial court that a party has proved the 
elements of its boundary by acquiescence claim is a conclusion of law which is 
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard RHN Corp. v. VeibelU 2004 UT 60, 
96 P.3d 935; Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). However, such a 
determination is highly fact sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of 
discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah 
App. 1999). 
Issue Preserved at: [Addendum "3," p. 6, ^ 32]. 
Did the trial court err in making its factual finding that Appellant Sterling 
Jones never gave Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property 
after Sterling Jones purchased the property in 1961? 
Standard of Review: When challenging a trial court's findings of fact, "[a]n 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 
'clearly erroneous.'" In re Estate ofBartell, 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Issue Preserved at: [R. 192:20 through 193:5]. [Addendum "3 ," pp. 9-11]. 
Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee attorney's fees and costs for 
having to respond to Appellants' Rule 52(b) Motion? 
Standard of Review: Whether attorney's fees are recoverable is a question of law 
reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In applying 
the correction-of-error standard, no particular deference is given to the trial court's 
ruling on questions of law. See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). 
Issue Preserved at: [Reply Memorandum, attached hereto as Addendum "5," pp. 4-
5]. [Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Judgment, 
attached hereto as Addendum "6," p. 3]. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants Sterling Jones and Dorothy Jones appeal the Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order entered by the Honorable Claudia Laycock of the Fourth 
Judicial District, Provo Department, State of Utah on January 2, 2004 and the Ruling on 
Defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Judgment entered by the 
Honorable Claudia Laycock on March 8, 2004. 
Specifically, Appellants seek review of the trial court's findings and conclusions 
that: (1) Plaintiff proved the second element of his boundary by acquiescence claim, 
"mutual acquiescence," (2) Plaintiff was legally entitled to be awarded an approximately 3 
acre parcel of property by essentially converting Plaintiffs boundary by acquiescence 
claim into an adverse possession claim, which allowed Plaintiff to avoid the property tax 
requirement, (3) Sterling Jones never gave Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed 
property after Sterling Jones purchased the property in 1961, and (4) Plaintiff was entitled 
to attorney's fees for having to respond to Appellants' Rule 52(b) Motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The "Disputed Property" 
Appellants are the record owners of a certain parcel of property (the "disputed 
property") located in Spanish Fork, Utah and more particularly described as: 
Commencing 11.60 chains West of the Northeast Comer of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 15, Township 8 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence South 2.50 chains; thence South 15° East 4 chains; thence 
South 40° East 5.30 chains; thence North 71 ° East 2.75 chains; thence North 
10° West 150 chains; thence North 3° East 2.65 chains; thence North 2° 
West 1.35 chains; thence North 67° West 2.35 chains; thence South 57° 
West 2.23 chains; thence North 53° West 2.24 chains; thence North 15° 
West 3.90 chains; thence West .28 chains to the point of beginning. Area 
3.32 acres. 
Appellants purchased the disputed property on May 24, 1961 at a tax sale. [R. 191: 
16-21]. [Addendum " 1 , " p. 5, f 28]. Since purchasing the disputed property, Appellants 
have continued to pay yearly property taxes thereon to the present time. [R. 205:12-16]. 
The disputed property is bordered on the south side by a parcel of land owned by 
Appellants (the "southern property"). [Addendum " 1 , " p. 2, f^ 3]. Three fences (an 
electric, wooden and metal/mesh fence), which run in an east/west direction, separate 
Appellants southern property from the disputed property to the north. [Addendum " 1 , " p. 
2, f 4]. These three fences are contiguous and in very close proximity to each other. The 
original wood fence was built as part of Appellants' horse corral in approximately 1958. 
[Addendum " 1 , " p. 3, f 11]. The electric and mental/mesh fence were installed to prevent 
horses on the disputed property from chewing the wood fence. [R. 272:6 through 
273:14]. 
The eastern border of the disputed property is demarcated by a fence that runs in a 
north/south direction. The western border of the disputed property is demarcated by a 
fence that runs in a north/south direction. [Addendum " 1 , " p. 2, ^ [ 4]. 
A water-well is situated within the disputed property on the west side of the 
disputed property. [R. 273:20 through 274:10]. [Addendum " 1 , " p. 2, f 6]. An old horse 
trailer sits on the disputed property. [R. 241:21 through 243:5; 289:5-8]. 
The south-eastern side of the disputed property is used as a corn silage pit. 
Although within the legal boundaries of the disputed property, the corn silage pit is 
divided from the rest of the disputed property by a small wire fence that runs in a 
north/south direction. Appellee did not make any claim of ownership as to the com silage 
pit portion of the disputed property during trial. [R. 78:25 through 81:23]. [Addendum 
«l,wp.2,H5]. 
Appellee owns two parcels of property that abut the northern border of the disputed 
property (the "northern properties"). [Addendum " 1 , " p. 2, ^ 5]. Appellee's grandfather, 
Charles Argyle, mistakenly believed that deeds to the two northern properties included the 
disputed property. Charles Argyle purchased the two northern properties in 1953. 
[Addendum " 1 , " p. 2, j^ 1]. Thereafter, Appellee, his predecessors in interest, and the rest 
of the Argyle family mistakenly assumed that the disputed property was included in the 
1953 purchase. [R. 39:14-25; R. 167:7 through 168:6]. Appellee acknowledged at trial, 
however, that he and his family never "looked at the plats." [R. 61:9-12]. In reality, 
Appellee's grandfather never purchased the disputed property, and Appellee's grandfather 
never held title to the disputed property. 
History of Use of the Disputed Property 
In approximately 1957, the Lake Shore Irrigation company decided that it would 
develop and improve the canal system that abutted portions of the southern and western 
sides of the disputed property. [Addendum " 1 , " p. 3,1f 9]. The Lake Shore Irrigation 
company asked Appellant Sterling Jones whether he would be willing to grant the 
company 24 feet on the west side of his southern property so that the company could 
remove the "zig zag" of the canal and run the canal in a straight north/south direction. In 
exchange, the Lake Shore Irrigation company agreed to grant Appellant Sterling Jones 24 
feet on the north side of his southern property as an exchange. In other words, the 
northern border of Sterling Jones' southern property was extended 24 feet into the area of 
the disputed property. [R. 188:16 through 189:25]. After the exchange of land was 
accomplished, Sterling Jones sought to extend the fence line of his horse-corral into the 
disputed property. 
After the relocation of the canal in 1958, Charles Argyle and Appellant Sterling 
Jones had an argument concerning the appropriate location of the new fence line. [R. 
190:13-19]. [See also Addendum " 1 , " p. 3, % 10]. As a result this argument, Sterling 
Jones and Charles Argyle agreed that they would check their property descriptions in 
order to ascertain their true property lines. [R. 190:13-19]. [Addendum "3," p. 4, f 12]. 
In 1961, Appellant Sterling Jones did check the Utah County Plats and discovered 
that the disputed property was not owned by him or Charles Argyle but was going to be 
sold at a tax sale. [R. 190:13 through 191:7]. [Addendum " 1 , " p. 5,127]. Sterling Jones 
purchased the disputed property at the tax sale and has continued to pay taxes on the 
disputed property. [R. 205: 12-16]. [Addendum " 1 , " p. 5, % 27]. Subsequently, 
Appellants discovered the disputed property was historically owned by Sterling Jones' 
grandfather, Llewellyn Jones by a land patent which was recorded in 1893. [R. 191:8-15]. 
Appellant Sterling Jones and his wife, Appellant Dorothy Jones testified at trial 
that after purchasing the disputed property in 1961, Sterling Jones encountered Charles 
Argyle and told him that he had purchased the property, but that Charles Argyle could 
continue using the disputed property because Mr. Argyle had fewer livestock and that he 
(Sterling Jones) could not make use of the property for grazing purposes. [R. 192-194; 
197-198; 222-226]. Because Charles Argyle is deceased, none of the Appellee's 
witnesses could provide testimony as to whether or not Appellant Sterling Jones ever had 
a conversation with Charles Argyle wherein he was granted permission to use the disputed 
property. 
Appellee and his predecessors continued to believe the disputed property was 
theirs, and used the disputed property as a shooting range, pasture and recreation area 
since 1953. Appellee also rented the disputed property to non-parties for pasturing. 
[Addendum"!,"p. 4,% 20]. 
Appellants and various family members maintained the water well on the property 
and continued to maintain certain fence lines since 1961. [Addendum " 1 , " p. 5, f^ 26]. 
During trial, Appellants and their witnesses provided unrebutted testimony that they had 
made some use of the disputed property since 1961. Appellant Sterling Jones testified 
that he and his son-in-law would pump or haul water from the well located within the 
disputed property line. [R. 201:17 through 203:16]. Appellants' daughter, Marilyn 
Argyle, testified that since the time she was a child, she would play on the disputed 
property and that she frequently enters the disputed property to "check it out." [R. 240:16 
through 241:25]. 
Appellants' son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, testified that he maintains the eastern and 
southern fence lines of the disputed property. [R. 266:14-16]. Sterling Argyle also 
testified that he spent money and attempted to repair the well on the property as recently 
as 2001. [R. 273:15-19]. At one point, while Sterling Argyle and his son were repairing 
the well on the disputed property, Appellee actually came by and spoke with Sterling 
Argyle. [R. 274:17-24]. Sterling Argyle testified that he would see Appellee 
approximately 20-30 times a year while Sterling Argyle was on or around the disputed 
property. [R. 277:12-22]. Finally, Sterling Argyle testified that he helped Appellee's 
predecessor install the western fence on the disputed property. [R. 283:8 through 284:17]. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court openly recognized that "[s]ince 1953, 
defendants' [Appellants'] use of the property has been limited to maintaining portions of 
the southern fence and maintaining the artesian well." [Addendum "3," p. 6, f^ 32]. 
Appellee claims that he is entitled to ownership of the majority of the disputed 
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property based upon the doctrine of "boundary by acquiescence." Appellants claim that 
Appellee is not entitled to ownership of the disputed property because Appellee cannot 
establish one of the required elements of a boundary by acquiescence, namely, "mutual 
acquiescence." Appellants also counterclaimed against Appellee for waste and 
destruction of the disputed property as well as unlawful detainer damages based upon 
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10. 
The Improper Award of Attorney's Fees 
Only July 25, 2003, the trial court issued an initial Memorandum Decision for the 
case. [Addendum "3"]. The trial court ruled that Appellee had established the requisite 
elements of his boundary by acquiescence claim, and that title should be quieted in 
Appellee's name. The Appellee, upon order of the trial court, prepared Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. [Addendum "7"]. On August 18, 2003, Appellants filed 
an Objection to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. [Addendum "8"]. The 
trial court agreed with several of Appellants' objections and issued a Ruling on 
Defendants' Objection. [Addendum "4"]. Appellee was compelled to file Amended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. [Addendum "1"]. 
After this first round of amendments had been completed, Appellants timely filed a 
Rule 52 (b) Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Judgment on January 12, 2004. 
[Addendum "2"]. Therein, Appellants requested that the trial court reconsider the issues 
of mutual acquiescence in light of specific testimony offered at trial Appellants also 
asked the trial court to reconsider whether the fact that the original and subsequent fences 
demarcating the southern boundary of the disputed property functioned as part of a horse 
corral altered the finding that the fences were actually intended to serve as boundaries. 
Finally, Appellants asked the trial court to consider whether it should have granted 
summary judgment in favor of Appellants on an earlier Rule 56 motion. 
Appellee filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Rule 52 Motion to 
Amend Findings and Judgment. [Addendum "9"]. At the conclusion of the 
memorandum, Appellee requested that the trial court order Appellants to pay attorney's 
fees in the amount of $1,000.00. The only basis for the requested attorney's fees was that 
Appellee had been "forced to incur additional attorney's fees and costs responding to 
these baseless and irrelevant motions." [Addendum "9," p. 16]. Appellee did not invoke 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56, or any contractual provision as a basis for 
the attorney's fee request. 
In their Reply Memorandum, Appellants noted several relevant factual and legal 
issues that the trial court did not properly consider or address in its final decision. 
[Addendum "5"]. The trial court ultimately issued its Ruling on Defendants' Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact and Judgment on March 8, 2004. [Addendum "6"]. In the final 
paragraph of the Ruling, the trial court notes: 
Plaintiff [Appellee] argues that costs and fees are justified because defendants 
[Appellants] have made the same arguments that were presented and denied in 
the Court's Amended Memorandum Decision from October 2003 and because 
defendants have improperly asked for reconsideration of the summary 
judgment motion from January 2003. The Court agrees with plaintiff and 
awards plaintiff attorney's fees and costs. [See Addendum "6," p. 3]. 
The trial court provided no reference to any statutory or contractual authority to 
support the award of attorney's fees; nor did the trial court provide an example of how 
Appellants' Rule 52(b) motion was a mere redundancy. 
Appellants Unlawful Detainer and Waste Counterclaims 
In their Amended Answer and Counterclaim, Appellants asserted claims for 
"unlawful detainer" and "waste" against Appellee. [Addendum "10," pp. 7-11]. Because 
the trial court ultimately concluded that Appellee prevailed on his boundary by 
acquiescence claim and that title should be quieted in his name, the trial court found 
Appellants' counterclaims to be "moot." [Addendum "3," p. 15-16]. If this Court 
reverses the trial court's ruling on the boundary by acquiescence issue, Appellants 
counterclaims should be fully considered by the trial court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
"The elements of boundary by acquiescence are (i) occupation up to a visible line 
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining landowners." Jacobs v. Hafen, 
917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996). The trial court in this case concluded that Appellee 
proved all four elements of his boundary by acquiescence claim. 
In fact, there are several grounds upon which Appellants proved that "mutual 
acquiescence" never occurred, including: (1) the boundary line was disputed and 
Appellant Sterling Jones do not "recognize" or accept the line, but instead agreed to 
ascertain the correct boundary line, (2) the fence-line that was claimed by Appellee to 
mark a boundary was merely part of the Appellants' horse-corral and was constructed as 
an enclosure for Appellants' horses and was not intended to demarcate a boundary line, 
(3) Appellants became aware of the "true" boundaries of the disputed property after 
purchasing the disputed property in 1961, (4) the trial court effectively converting 
Appellee's boundary by acquiescence claim into an adverse possession claim, which 
allowed Appellee to avoid the property tax requirement, (5) Appellants also made some 
use of the disputed property. Appellants argue that this Court should reverse the trial 
court's legal conclusion that Appellee proved all the requisite elements of his boundary by 
acquiescence claim. 
The trial court also improperly concluded that Appellant Sterling Jones never gave 
Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property. When viewed in light of 
testimony presented by the parties at trial, this factual finding by the trial court is clearly 
erroneous. Appellants ask this Court to reverse the trial court's factual conclusion 
because it is against the clear weight of evidence presented at trial. 
Finally, the trial court improperly awarded Appellee attorney's fees and costs for 
having to respond to Appellants' Rule 52(b) motion. The trial court cited no statutory or 
contractual authority for the award. This Court should reverse the trial court's decision to 
grant Appellee his attorney's fees and costs. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred in finding that Appellee proved the second element of 
his boundary by acquiescence claim, "mutual acquiescence," when the 
boundary line was disputed and Appellant Sterling Jones do not "recognize" 
or accept the line, but instead agreed to ascertain the correct boundary line. 
The trial court erred in finding that Appellee proved the second element of his 
boundary by acquiescence claim ("mutual acquiescence") because neither Appellant 
Sterling Jones nor Appellee's predecessor, Charles Argyle, accepted the 1958 fence as 
definitively demarcating the boundary between the disputed property and Appellants' 
southern property. Rather, Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle agreed to ascertain the 
correct boundary line. 
The determination by a trial court that a party has proved the elements of its 
boundary by acquiescence claim is a conclusion of law which is reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard RUN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935; Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). However, such a determination is highly fact 
sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, 
LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah App. 1999). 
"The elements of boundary by acquiescence are (i) occupation up to a visible line 
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining landowners." Jacobs v. Hafen, 
917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996). JnAult v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781, the Utah 
Supreme Court provided a detailed analysis of the second element, "mutual 
acquiescence." The court explained: 
Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party attempting to 
establish a particular line as the boundary between properties must establish 
that the parties mutually acquiesced in the line as separating the properties. To 
do so, the party must show that both parties recognized and acknowledged a 
visible line, such as a fence or building, as the boundary.... 
When the parties agree that the line to which they occupy is not the true line 
and agree subsequently to ascertain the true boundary, the quality of 
acquiescence is destroyed and no boundary is fixed by continued occupation. 
Indeed, mere conversations between the parties evidencing either an ongoing 
dispute as to the property line or an unwillingness by one of the adjoining 
landowners to accept the line as the boundary refute any allegation that the 
parties have mutually acquiesced in the line as the property demarcation. Id at 
Tf 18, Tf 21 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The last two paragraphs of the above quote are particularly relevant to the facts of 
the present case. In 1958, Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle had an oral argument 
concerning the correct boundary line between the disputed property and Appellants' 
southern property. Sterling Jones testified that he suggested that the parties subsequently 
ascertain the true boundary line. Sterling Jones did, in fact, ascertain the true boundary 
line after checking the Utah County Plats. Whether Charles Argyle did or not is 
unknown. 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence implies that the adjoining landowners 
were once uncertain [of the boundary lines of the property]... and that the boundary was 
marked on the ground in settlement thereof." Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 366 
(Utah 1984) (internal citations omitted). As noted by the Ault court, however, if there is 
an open dispute about the boundary line and the parties do not "recognize" or accept a 
line, but instead agree to ascertain the correct boundary line, "the quality of acquiescence 
is destroyed and no boundary is fixed by continued occupation." Even a "mere" 
conversation evidencing an ongoing dispute between the parties as to the property line or 
unwillingness by even one of the adjoining landowners to accept the line as a boundary 
negates the element of mutual acquiescence in the line as the property demarcation. 
Such a conversation did occur in 1958 between the Sterling Jones and Charles 
Argyle. Sterling Jones testified that the parties subsequently ascertain the true boundary 
line. 
In Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979), there was a visible boundary, 
persisting for 40 years. The defendant's predecessor in Hales testified, however, that he 
never acquiesced in the fence as a boundary, and that he did not consider the fence was on 
the boundary. Id, at 559. The Hales court ruled that "the parties must know of the 
existence of the line as the boundary to establish acquiescence." Id. 
Sterling Jones absolutely did not recognize or accept the fence-line as a boundary 
and expressed this to Charles Argyle. Moreover, Sterling Jones built the fence as part of 
an enclosure for his horses—not as a border to separate his southern property from the 
disputed property. 
It is worth noting that Appellants made these same arguments to the trial court in 
their Rule 52(b) motion. [See Addendum "2," pp. 3-4]. Based upon the undisputed fact 
that Appellants did not, from the outset, recognize the fence-line as a demarcating their 
southern property from the disputed property, it is apparent that the trial court erred in 
finding that Appellee proved the element of "mutual acquiescence." Under the correction-
of-error standard, this Court need not defer to the trial court's legal conclusion on this 
matter. However, the trial court is afforded some discretion in applying the specific facts 
of this case in determining whether Appellee proved the legal element of "mutual 
acquiescence." 
It is clear that the trial court exceeded its discretion in applying the specific and 
undisputed facts of this case to find that Appellee proved "mutual acquiescence." This 
Court should reverse the trial court and find that Appellee failed to establish the requisite 
element of "mutual acquiescence" and that Appellee's boundary by acquiescence claim 
must, accordingly, fail. 
2. The trial court erred in finding that Appellee proved his boundary by 
acquiescence claim, because the fence-line that was claimed by Appellee to 
mark a boundary was merely part of the Appellants' horse-corral and was 
constructed as an enclosure for Appellants' horses and was not intended to 
demarcate a boundary line. 
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The trial court erred in finding that Appellee proved the second element of his 
boundary by acquiescence claim ("mutual acquiescence") because the relevant fence-line 
at issue in this case was built by Appellant Sterling Jones to serve as a fence for his horse-
corral Furthermore, Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle never agreed that the fence-line 
would serve to demarcate the boundary between the disputed property and Appellants' 
southern property. 
The determination by a trial court that a party has proved the elements of its 
boundary by acquiescence claim is a conclusion of law which is reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard. RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935; Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). However, such a determination is highly fact 
sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, 
LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah App. 1999). 
In the case of Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1974), the court affirmed 
the finding by the trial court that defendants had failed to establish their boundary by 
acquiescence claim. The court specifically noted that "[t]he doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence cannot be invoked in the instant action, since there was evidence that clearly 
implied that the fence was not built pursuant to an agreement between adjoining 
landowners. The evidence indicated that the fence was constructed to control cattle and 
not to locate a boundary which was in doubt or uncertain." Id. at 1227. See also, Hales v. 
Frakes, 600 P.2d at 559-60. The Wright court explained that "to hold that a defendant's 
belief, reliance, and occupation up to the fence line, without more, were controlling in a 
boundary dispute would be to ignore the statutory guides for adverse possession, since 
defendant had not paid taxes on that portion of the land which he claimed." Id. 
In a similar case, Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954), the court addressed 
the following question: "[I]s acquiescence, or lack of acts inconsistent with acquiescence, 
for a long period of years sufficient to raise a conclusive presumption that the fence was 
intended to proclaim the boundary between two properties or does a showing that the 
parties did not, in fact, recognize the fence as a boundary take the situation out of the 
doctrine?" Id. at 1054. The Ringwood court's analysis of this question is particularly 
insightful and directly supports Appellants' argument in the instant case that the trial court 
erred in ruling that Appellee properly established his claim of boundary by acquiescence. 
The Ringwood court explains: 
It is stated in [Glenn v, Whitney, 116 Utah 267,273,209 P.2d 257,260 (Utah 
1949)]: "The theory under which a boundary line is established by long 
acquiescence along an existing fence line is founded on the doctrine that the 
parties erect the fence to settle some doubt or uncertainty which they may have 
as to the location of the true boundary, and the [sic] compromise their 
differences by agreeing to accept the fence line as the limiting line of their 
respective lands. The mere fact that a fence happens to be put up and neither 
party does anything about it for a long period of time will not establish it as the 
true boundary." 
The Ringwood court continues its analysis by quoting Hummel v. Young, 
265 P.2d 410, 411 (Utah 1953) as follows: 
We further pointed out in [Brown v. Milliner, 232 P.2d 202 (Utah 1951)] that 
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in the absence of evidence that the owners of adjoining property or their 
predecessors in interest ever made an express parol agreement as to the 
location of the boundary between them if they have occupied their respective 
premises up to an open boundary line visibly marked by monuments, fences or 
buildings for a long period of time and mutually recognized it as the dividing 
line between them, the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as 
located, if it can do so consistently with the fact appearing, and will not permit 
the parties nor their grantees to depart from such line. This rule is sometimes 
referred to as the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
Having concluded then that the evidence fails to establish that the fence in 
question was built pursuant to an express parol agreement between adjoining 
owners fixing the boundary, the question arises whether we can imply that 
such an agreement was made as we did in [Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 
P. 1009 (Utah 1906)] and in the cases following the Holmes case which are 
cited in [Brown v. Milliner]. We think not. In all of those cases such an 
agreement could be implied without doing violence to the evidence appearing. 
In view of the state of the evidence this court could and did imply that a 
boundary agreement had been made between the adjoining owners at some 
time during the past. As explained by this court in [Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 
267, 209 P.2d 257 (Utah 1949], the court in such cases indulges in the fiction 
that at some time in the past the adjoining owners were in dispute or uncertain 
as to the location of the true boundary and that they settled their differences by 
agreeing upon the fence or other monument as the dividing line between their 
properties. 
In the instant case, there is no room, in view of the evidence appearing, to 
imply that the fence was built pursuant to agreement between the adjoining 
owners. Ringwoodv, Bradford, 269 P.2d at 1055, 
In finding against the defendant who had asserted the boundary by acquiescence 
claim, the Ringwood court ultimately concluded: 
In the Hummel case, as in the present case, there was evidence that the fence 
was intended to enclose or exclude livestock. . . . 
As recognized in the cases, the presumption [of boundary by acquiescence] 
may be rebutted by (1) proof there actually was no agreement by the parties or 
(2) by proof that there could not have been a proper agreement. Factors 
showing the latter include the following: (a) no dispute or uncertainty over 
boundary, (b) line not intended as a boundary, (c) no parties available to make 
an agreement and (d) possibly mistake or inadvertence in locating the boundary 
line. Ringwoodv. Bradford, 269 P.2d at 1055-1056. 
In the instant case, the trial court openly recognized the fact that Appellant Sterling 
Jones built the original fence as part of an enclosure for his horses. [Addendum "4," p. 3]. 
No testimony was ever given at trial that Appellants or Charles Argyle agreed to install 
the fence-line to demarcate the border between the disputed property and Appellants' 
southern property. On the contrary, Sterling Jones installed the fence because he 
understood that the Lake Shore Irrigation company had allotted him an additional 24 feet 
which extended the northern border of his southern property. Although Charles Argyle 
confronted Sterling Jones about the installation of the fence, the parties actually agreed to 
subsequently check their boundary lines. The parties never agreed that the fence-line 
served as the boundary line between properties. 
The Ringwood, Hummel and Wright cases affirm the principle that a claim of 
boundary by acquiescence is rebutted if the fence-line in question serves as part of an 
animal enclosure and is not intended to serve as a boundary line. The trial court 
acknowledged that the fence-line built by Sterling Jones in 1958 was part of his horse-
corral. In addition, no evidence or testimony given at trial indicates that Sterling Jones 
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and Charles Argyle ever intended the fence-line to demarcate the boundary between the 
disputed property and Appellants' southern property. Thus, the requirement of "mutual 
acquiescence" cannot be established and Appellee's boundary by acquiescence claim must 
fail. 
The trial court clearly exceeded its discretion in applying the specific and 
undisputed facts of this case to find that Appellee proved "mutual acquiescence." This 
Court should reverse the trial court and find that Appellee failed to establish the requisite 
element of "mutual acquiescence." Consequently, Appellee's boundary by acquiescence 
claim must also fail. 
3. The trial court erred in finding that Appellee proved the second element of 
his boundary by acquiescence claim, "mutual acquiescence/' when, in fact, 
Appellants became aware of the "true" boundaries of the disputed property 
after purchasing the disputed property in 1961. 
The trial court erred in finding that Appellee proved the requisite element of 
"mutual acquiescence" because Appellants became aware of the true boundaries of the 
disputed property in 1961 and purchased the disputed property. 
The determination by a trial court that a party has proved the elements of its 
boundary by acquiescence claim is a conclusion of law which is reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935; Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). However, such a determination is highly fact 
sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, 
LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d at 230. 
In light of the undisputed fact that Appellants became aware of the true boundary 
lines of the disputed property in 1961, the trial court erred in concluding that Appellants 
mutually acquiesced in the fence-line as a true boundary. 
"[I]f there is no uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary line the parties 
may not, knowing where the true boundary line is, establish a boundary line by 
acquiescence at another place." Nunley v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117, 122 (1962). 
"Accordingly, knowledge of the true boundary is relevant to a determination of whether a 
party acquiesced in a particular line as the boundary." Wilkinson Family Farm v. Babcock, 
993 P.2d at 231-32. 
The foregoing language is relevant to the facts of this case because Appellants did 
subsequently discover the true boundary lines of the disputed property after reviewing the 
Utah County Plats. Upon reviewing the Utah County Plats, Appellants purchased the 
disputed property at a tax sale in 1961. Appellee provided no affirmative evidence at trial 
that Sterling Jones was ever uncertain as to the boundaries of the disputed property after 
purchasing the disputed property in 1961. On the contrary, Sterling Jones provided 
testimony that after purchasing the disputed property in 1961, he was aware of the 
disputed property's boundary lines. [R. 193:18-25]. While Appellants may not have 
known the precise boundary line between their southern property and the abutting 
disputed property in 1958 when the fence-line was built by Sterling Jones, the fact 
remains that Appellants subsequently became aware of the true boundary line and even 
purchased the disputed property itself. 
hi reaching its initial ruling in this case, the trial court stated that "[mjutual 
acquiescence cannot be destroyed when one party later learns that a boundary line is 
incorrect, yet fails to inform the other of the discrepancy/' [Addendum "3 ," p. 13]. This 
statement is based upon an implicit (and mistaken) assumption—that both Appellants and 
Charles Argyle had previously mutually acquiesced in the fence- line as the proper 
demarcation between the disputed property and Appellants' southern property. 
As set forth in the preceding sections of this brief, Appellants and Charles Argyle 
never agreed upon a set boundary line. The fence that was built by Sterling Jones was an 
extension of his horse-corral, and was not built in recognition of any boundary line. 
Moreover, the trial court's statement contravenes established Utah law. 
Several decisions in Utah have expressly held that sharing the use of one's own 
property is not equivalent to a disclaimer of ownership and that failure to claim to the true 
line is not equivalent to acquiescence. See Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 
(1951); Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949); Ringwood v. Bradford, 2 
Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954). More recently, the Ault court has held that "record 
property owners are not required to take legal action, or otherwise "oust" someone 
adversely occupying their property to maintain their legal rights in the property. Ault v 
Holden, 2002 UT 33,^21. 
The trial court failed to apply established Utah law in reaching its Conclusions of 
Law. The trial court states that "mutual acquiescence was not destroyed because one 
party knew the true boundary line of the properties." [Addendum " 1 , " p. 8, Tf 4]. The trial 
court further adds in the same paragraph that Sterling Jones "cannot now claim that there 
was no acquiescence merely because he knew the correct boundary." However, Fuoco v. 
Williams, 18 Utah 2d 282,421 P.2d 944, 947 (1966), as cited in both Wright v. Clissold, 
521 P.2d at 1227 and Wilkinson Family Farm, 993 P.2d at 231, provides that "recognition 
and acquiescence must be mutual, and both parties must have knowledge of the existence 
of a line as the boundary line (emphasis added)." Once Sterling Jones had bought the 
disputed property at tax sale in 1961, there could be no knowledge or recognition on his 
part of the boundary. As a matter of operation of law, the boundary no longer existed 
under Utah law since he knew and had in fact caused that boundary line to be invalidated. 
The fact that he let his neighbor use the property, as made explicit in the Wilkinson 
ruling, was not sufficient to establish or preserve a boundary at that point, since 
"acquiescence in use is not equivalent to acquiescence in a boundary." Id. at 232 
(footnote 3). 
The trial court actually seeks to impose upon Appellants a duty of disclosure to 
Appellee: "Defendant Sterling Jones failed to disclose that the record boundary line was 
different than the boundary line that was established in approximately 1958 by the fence 
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that he himself erected" and that as a result "[h]e cannot now claim that there was no 
acquiescence merely because he knew the correct boundary/' [Addendum " 1 , " p. 8, f^ 4]. 
However, the Supreme Court test language in Ault, citing Hales, reiterates that 
"occupation to the fence without interference was not sufficient to establish defendant's 
acquiescence in the fence as a boundary." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, \ 20. 
There was no testimony presented at trial showing that there were any other indicia 
of acquiescence beside the occupation to the fence. The trial court still chose to treat this 
occupation up to the fence line in its second conclusion of law as the prima facie sign of 
acquiescence, and bases a great part of its subsequent conclusions of law, including 
paragraph 4, onthat erroneous basis. In so doing, the trial court shifted the Appellee's 
burden of proof of establishing the element of "mutual acquiescence" to Appellants—who 
were required to prove non-acquiescence. "The party attempting to establish a particular 
line as the boundary between properties must establish that the parties mutually 
acquiesced in the line as separating the properties." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, f^ 18. In 
this case, Appellee failed to establish "mutual acquiescence." Appellee only proved only 
occupation to a visible line (a separate element of a boundary by acquiescence claim), and 
that neighbors believed that Appellee and his predecessors owned the disputed property. 
The trial court was plainly wrong in imposing upon Appellants a duty to disclose to 
Appellee that they had purchased the disputed property. Ault reiterates the principle 
established in Hales that "record property owners are not required to take legal action or 
otherwise "oust" someone adversely occupying their property to maintain their legal rights 
to the property." Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 3 3 4 20. "They must only take some action 
manifesting that they do not acquiesce or recognize the particular line, e.g., a fence, as a 
boundary between the properties." Id. The trial court acknowledged that Sterling Jones 
and his son-in-law used and serviced the well located on the disputed property. By the 
trial Court's own recitation of the facts, it also knew Sterling Jones bought the property in 
1961. Buying the disputed property and securing title to it was the ultimate action 
demonstrating that Appellants did not acquiesce in their neighbor's right to it. Paying 
taxes on the property on the public record for more than 40 years also demonstrated that 
Appellants did not acknowledge Appellee's or Appellee's predecessors' claims to 
ownership. Yet the trial court chose to create an artificial standard, foreign to Utah law, 
that Appellants were under a duty to confront their neighbor's descendants and heirs with 
the fact of Appellants legal ownership. Such a position would require Appellants to 
apprehend the state-of-mind of Charles' Argyle's descendants and heirs and then act to 
disabuse them of their mistaken assumption. The imposition of this artificial duty clearly 
constitutes error on the part of the trial court. 
The fence is still in existence today and functions as a corral to keep horses in. 
The fence-line that divides the disputed property from Appellants southern property was 
never constructed in settlement of the boundary dispute between Appellants and Charles 
Argyle. Mutual acquiescence did not exist from the outset. Appellants subsequently 
ascertained the true boundary line between the disputed property and Appellants southern 
property. Appellants purchased the disputed property. 
In viewing this sequence of events in light of the principle that "knowledge of the 
true boundary is relevant to a determination of whether a party acquiesced in a particular 
line as the boundary/' it is clear that Appellants9 subsequent discovery of the true 
boundary line is relevant to the question of "mutual acquiescence." "Mutual 
acquiescence" was not established in 1958. Since it was not established at that time, and 
Appellants thereafter ascertained the true boundary line, mutual acquiescence in the fence-
line as the actual boundary has never existed. 
The trial court clearly exceeded its discretion in applying the specific and 
undisputed facts of this case to find that Appellee proved "mutual acquiescence." This 
Court should reverse the trial court and find that Appellee failed to establish the requisite 
element of "mutual acquiescence." Consequently, Appellee's boundary by acquiescence 
claim must also fail. 
4. The trial court erred by effectively converting Appellee's boundary by 
acquiescence claim into an adverse possession claim, which allowed Appellee 
to avoid the property tax requirement 
In concluding that Appellee proved the four elements necessary to establish his 
boundary by acquiescence claim, the trial court effectively granted Appellee title to 
approximately 3 acres of property that the trial court acknowledged was actually owned by 
Appellants. Appellants have faithfully paid taxes on the disputed property since 1961. 
Neither Appellee nor his predecessors in interest ever paid taxes on the disputed property. 
The determination by a trial court that a party has proved the elements of its 
boundary by acquiescence claim is a conclusion of law which is reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935; Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). However, such a determination is highly fact 
sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, 
LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah App. 1999). 
In Utah, a party claiming adverse possession bears the burden of proving that 
possession was open, notorious, and hostile and that taxes were paid for the entire 
statutory period. Marchant v. Park City, 788 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Utah 1990). 
In Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954), the Utah Supreme Court upheld 
the lower court's decision to quiet title in plaintiffs. Plaintiffs predecessor had built a 
fence for the purpose of protecting new Box Elder trees from grazing sheep. Defendant 
built a cabin on the other side of the fence on property that belonged to plaintiff. 
Defendant believed that the property up to the fence-line belonged to him. After learning 
that the property did not belong to him, defendant claimed ownership under the theory of 
boundary by acquiescence. The lower court denied defendant's claim and ordered 
defendant to remove a cabin that had been built. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, 
finding that despite the fact that plaintiffs "did not affirmatively claim the property 
beyond the fence nor [...] make any use of it inconsistent with the theory that they 
recognized the fence as a boundary line," the line was not intended as a boundary and 
therefore, defendant's boundary by acquiescence claim must fail Id. at 1054-56. 
Importantly, the Ringwood court concluded that "[t]o hold that the defendant's 
belief, reliance, and occupation up to the fence line, without more, are controlling in a 
boundary dispute would be to ignore the statutory guides for adverse possession since she 
did not pay taxes on that portion of land which she claims." Id. at 1056. 
The facts of the present case are similar to those in Ringwood in that: (1) 
Appellants built the fence-line as part of their horse-corral, (2) Appellee and his 
predecessors (mistakenly) believed for a long period that the disputed property belonged 
to them, and (3) neither Appellee nor his predecessors paid any taxes on the disputed 
property. 
Additionally, Appellant Sterling Jones affirmatively expressed his doubts about 
where the actual boundaries of the disputed property were located and suggested that he 
and Charles Argyle check the boundaries. As argued supra, both the fact that Appellants 
built the fence to serve as an animal enclosure and the fact that Sterling Jones openly 
disagreed that the fence-line demarcated the boundary between the properties rebut 
Appellee's claim that "mutual acquiescence" ever occurred. 
Like the defendant in Ringwood, Appellee's belief, reliance, and occupation up to 
the fence line are insufficient to establish his boundary by acquiescence claim. The trial 
court in the instant case ignored the "statutory guides for adverse possession" and granted 
almost an entire 3.32 acre parcel of property legally titled in Appellants' name to Appellee 
even though Appellee and his predecessors never paid taxes on the disputed property. 
The trial court's decision to wholly deprive Appellants of the ownership of almost 
an entire parcel of property which they legally purchased and paid taxes on for 
approximately 43 years is manifestly unjust and inequitable. Under the correction-of-error 
standard, this Court need not defer to the trial court's legal conclusions. However, the 
trial court is granted an amount of deference in applying the law to the facts in this case. 
This Court should find that the trial court erred in finding that Appellee proved the 
requisite element of "mutual acquiescence." This Court should further find that the trial 
court wrongfully deprived Appellants of property which they legally owned and that the 
trial court's actions in doing so equated to a grant of adverse possession in favor of 
Appellee without requiring Appellee to pay property taxes on the disputed property. 
The trial court clearly exceeded its discretion in applying the specific and 
undisputed facts of this case to find that Appellee proved "mutual acquiescence." This 
Court should reverse the trial court and find that Appellee failed to establish the requisite 
element of "mutual acquiescence." Consequently, Appellee's boundary by acquiescence 
claim must also fail. 
5. The trial court erred in finding that Appellee proved the second element of 
his boundary by acquiescence claim, "mutual acquiescence," when 
Appellants also made some use of the disputed property. 
The trial court erred in finding that Appellee proved "mutual acquiescence." 
Appellants and members of their family made some use of the disputed property since 
1953. This fact, in turn, negates Appellee's assertion that Appellants "mutually 
acquiesced" in the southern fence-line as an actual boundary. 
The determination by a trial court that a party has proved the elements of its 
boundary by acquiescence claim is a conclusion of law which is reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935; Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). However, such a determination is highly fact 
sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of discretion. Wilkinson Family Farm, 
LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 230 (Utah App. 1999). 
During trial, Appellants and their witnesses provided testimony that they had made 
some use of the disputed property since 1953. Appellant Sterling Jones testified that he 
and his son-in-law would pump or haul water from the well located within the disputed 
property line. [R. 201:17 through 203:16]. Appellants' daughter, Marilyn Argyle testified 
that since the time she was a child, she would play on the disputed property and that she 
frequently enters the disputed property to "check it out." [R. 240:16 through 241:25]. 
Appellants' son-in-law, Sterling Argyle testified that he maintains the eastern and 
southern fence lines of the disputed property. [R. 266:14-16]. Sterling Argyle also 
testified that he spent money and attempted to repair the well on the property as recently 
as 2001. [R. 273:15-19], At one point, while Sterling Argyle and his son were repairing 
the well on the disputed property, Appellee actually came by and spoke with Sterling 
Argyle. [R. 274:17-24], Sterling Argyle testified that he would see Appellee 
approximately 20-30 times a year while Sterling Argyle was on or around the disputed 
property. [R. 277:12-22]. Dorothy Jones testified that Appellants' children played on the 
disputed property. [R. 221:14-21 ]. Finally, Sterling Argyle testified that he helped 
Appellee's predecessor install the western fence on the disputed property. [R. 283:8 
through 284:17]. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court recognized that "[s]ince 1953, 
defendants' [Appelleants'] use of the property has been limited to maintaining portions of 
the southern fence and maintaining the artesian well." [Addendum "3," p. 6, f^ 32]. While 
this statement ignores some of the testimony cited supra, the fact that Appellants and 
members of the family made some use of the disputed property clearly implies that 
Appellants did not recognize, or treat the southern fence-line as a boundary. In fact, this 
would be entirely sensible given the fact that Appellants actually purchased the disputed 
property in 1961. 
In Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229,231 (Utah App. 1999), 
this Court explained: 
Mutual acquiescence in a line as a boundary has two requirements: that both 
parties recognize the specific line, and that both parties acknowledge the line 
as the demarcation between the properties. See Fuoco v. Williams, 18 Utah 2d 
282, 421 P.2d 944, 947 (1966)- Acquiescence does not require an explicit 
agreement, "but recognition and acquiescence must be mutual, and both parties 
must have knowledge of the existence of a line as [the] boundary line" 
Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added) 
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(quoting Fuoco, All P.2d at 947). 
The trial avoided the implication of unrebutted witness testimony showing use by 
Appellants and their family, and concluded that Appellee had, indeed, proved all requisite 
elements of his boundary by acquiescence claim. The trial court exceeded its discretion in 
applying the specific and undisputed facts of this case to find that Appellee proved 
"mutual acquiescence." This Court should reverse the trial court and find that Appellee 
failed to establish the requisite element of "mutual acquiescence." Consequently, 
Appellee's boundary by acquiescence claim must also fail. 
6. The trial court erred in making its factual finding that Sterling Jones never 
gave Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property after Sterling 
Jones purchased the property in 1961. 
This particular section of Appellants' argument challenges the trial court's specific 
finding of fact that Appellant Sterling Jones did not grant Charles Argyle permission to 
use the disputed property after Appellants purchased the property in 1961. Because 
Appellants challenge the trial court's findings of fact, Appellants are required to meet the 
"marshalling requirement." When challenging a trial court's findings of fact, "[a]n 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against 
the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" In re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886. 
Marshalled Evidence 
Appellants contended that sometime after purchasing the disputed property at a tax 
sale in 1961, Appellant Sterling Jones had a conversation with Appellee's predecessor, 
Charles Argyle. During that conversation, Appellant Sterling Jones testified that he told 
Charles Argyle that Mr. Argyle could use the property. [R. 192:20 through 193:5; 194:5-
12]. Appellant Sterling Jones also testified that he told his wife that same morning that he 
had granted Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property. [R. 197:21 through 
198:12; 206:9-14]. Sterling Jones also testified that he told his son-in-law, Sterling 
Argyle that he owned the disputed property. [R. 205:17-23]. Appellant Dorothy Jones, 
Sterling Jones' wife, testified that her husband told her that he had granted Charles Argyle 
permission to use the disputed property. [R. 223:19 through 225:25]. 
The question of whether Appellant Sterling Jones ever granted Charles Argyle 
permission to use the disputed property is highly relevant. If an owner is aware of his true 
boundary line and grants another party permission to use property within the owner's 
boundaries, then mutual acquiescence is destroyed. Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. 
Babcock, 993?2d at 231. 
In its initial Memorandum Decision, the trial court concluded that Sterling Jones 
never granted Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property. The trial court 
provided the following explanation for its decision: 
This Court is not convinced that defendant [Appellant] Sterling Jones granted 
Charles Aigyk permission lu use the disputed pioperK lor tin h'11ov\ing 
reasons. First, defendant Sterling Jones testified that I .. -1 his son-in-law. 
Sterling Argyll, that he was record owner of the disputed pi operty "five or six 
years ago" or about the same time that Roger Argyle moved onto the property. 
In contrast, during his testimony, Sterling .Argyle testified defendant Sterling 
Jones told him in 1962 or 1963 that he was the record owner of the disputed 
property; and that Charles Argyle was merely using the property until 
defendants were in need of it. Second, the testimonv of Daniel PouNen 
established that as late as April 2000 during the fire, Sterling Argyle stated :hai 
the disputed property belonged to Plaintiff [Appel1 I'u*. vfendant 
[Appellantj Dorothy Jones testified that he; ! usbaiul old IK-I alxur the 
permissive use sometime in KM" OI I WO. Daring her testimony, she 
repeatedly stated i •:•« ••i*tknowvo* 1 don't ^member/' It was obvious to the 
Court that defendant Dorothy Jones did not have a clear recollection (if any) of 
the alleged conversation with her husband. Fourth, Marilyn Jones Argyle, the 
defendant's daughter, testified that she had always (since childhood) believed 
the property belonged to her father and her grandfather before that. This 
testimony is inconsistent with defendant Sterling Jones's [sic] testimony that 
prior to 1957 he believed that Charles Arygle owned the property. Finally, the 
..ourt finds it suspicious that, after the death of Charles Argyle, defendants 
failed to inform any of diaries' Argyle's children or grandchildren that the 
property belonged to the defendants. In sum, the ('ourt finds that the testimony 
presented by defendants to establish that defendant Sterling Jones granted 
Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property in the early 1960s was 
contrixed and uncom ineintiT ( VMendnm "i '" \w |0 * ! • 
1 In MM I '») ihr foregoing paragraph includes a footnote where the trial court 
elaborates: 
Defendants may contend that plaintilt did no: pio\KK- ,n.v oudciux ;.ui, . 
conversation did not occur and, as a result, plaintiff failed to fulfill its burden 
of proof. However, the Court recognizes that Charles Argyle, the only other 
party who could have testified about this conversation from personal 
knowledge, has passed away, and therefore, plaintiff has had to rely upon di 
. u\nri .*f th^ nnriies to establish his case. 
Because the trial court expressly identified five bases in support oi ii\ ^ oiu 
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that Sterling Jones never gave Charles Arygle permission to use the disputed property, 
Appellants will marshall the evidence using each of the noted bases as a heading. 
First, defendant Sterling Jones testified that he told his son-in-law, Sterling 
Argyle, that he was record owner of the disputed property 'five or six years ago " or 
about the same time that Roger Argyle moved onto the property. In contrast, during his 
testimony, Sterling Argyle testified defendant Sterling Jones told him in 1962 or 1963 that 
he was the record owner of the disputed property, and that Charles Argyle was merely 
using the property until defendants were in need of it. 
Sterling Jones testified that he told his son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, that he owned 
the disputed property. [R. 205:17-23]. 
Sterling Jones testified that he could not remember when he told his son-in-law, 
Sterling Argyle, that he owned the disputed property, but that he "guessed" it was about 
the time that Appellee moved onto the property in 1998 or 1997. [R. 214:24 through 
215:25]. 
Sterling Argyle testified that in 1961 or 1962, his father-in-law, Sterling Jones, told 
him that Appellants owned the disputed property and that Charles Argyle was merely 
using the property until Appellants were in need of it. [R. 284:18 through 285:22]. 
Second, the testimony of Daniel Poulsen established that as late as April 2000 
during the fire, Sterling Argyle stated that the disputed property belonged to Plaintiff 
[Appellee]. 
Daniel Poulsen testified that in approximately April 2000, a fire broke out on the 
north-east side of the disputed property. [R. 128:23-24]. 
Daniel Poulsen testified that during the fire, Sterling Argyle, Appellants' son-in-
law, appeared and when asked "whose property was where" by one of the firemen, 
Sterling Argyle stated "that is ours over there, and pointed to his barns and said this other 
piece is the Argyle's, meaning Roger." [R. 129:4 through 137:2; 147:8-14]. 
Third, defendant [Appellant] Dorothy Jones testified that her husband told her about the 
permissive use sometime in 1962 or 1963. During her testimony, she repeatedly stated "I 
don 't know " or "I don't remember. " It was obvious to the Court that defendant Dorothy 
Jones did not have a clear recollection (if any) of the alleged conversation with her 
Page 38 of 51 
husband. 
When asked whether she remembered a conversation between herself and her 
husband about anyone else using the property, Appellant Dorothy Jones stated that she 
"was mad at him [her husband] because he did, I guess. I don't know." [R. 222:14-24]. 
When asked if she remembered the approximate date that she had a conversation 
with her husband about the grant of permissive use, Dorothy Jones stated, "I don't 
remember the exact date but I know it was after we, we had been paying taxes, that we 
paid taxes on it." [R. 223:19-24]. 
When asked what time of day the conversation between herself and her husband 
occurred, Dorothy Jones stated, "It was, I, I don't exactly remember. It seemed like it was 
breakfast when he came home from feeding." When asked again, she indicated "I don't 
remember." When asked what her husband said to her when he came home in the 
morning, Dorothy Jones stated "Well, he just told me that he'd.. .1 don't remember. It's 
been too long away." [R. 224:3-17]. 
Fourth, Marilyn Jones Argyle, the defendant's daughter, testified that she had 
always (since childhood) believed the property belonged to her father and her 
grandfather before that. This testimony is inconsistent with defendant Sterling Jones's 
testimony that prior to 1957 he believed that Charles Arygle owned the property. 
When asked about her understanding regarding the disputed property, Marilyn 
Argyle testified, "My understanding is that it was a patent that my great grandfather had. 
Then it was my understanding that it was my grandfather, David Jones's property, and 
that then it was my father's property." [R. 239:18-22]. 
When asked about the disputed property, Appellant Sterling Jones stated "Well, for 
the large part it was, I always thought it was Charlie Argyle's and—" [R. 186:17-18]. 
Shortly thereafter, Appellant Sterling Jones elaborated, "And most of the years I 
thought it was, I though it was Charlie's and up until 19, about 1957 " [R. 186:22-
23]. 
Finally, the Court finds it suspicious that, after the death of Charles Argyle, defendants 
failed to inform any of Charles' Argyle's children or grandchildren that the property 
belonged to the defendants. 
Sterling Jones testified that although he told Charles Argyle about the purchase of 
the disputed property, he did not tell Appellee or Appellee's predecessors, Richard Argyle 
and Ron Argyle, about the purchase. [R. 213:17 through 214:23; 216:9 through 217:14]. 
The Trial Court's Factual Finding on the Issue of Permissive Use is "Clearly Erroneous" 
The trial court's factual finding that Sterling Jones never granted Charles Argyle 
permission to use the disputed property is so lacking in support as to be "against the clear 
weight of the evidence" even when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court. 
See Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999). 
The five bases that the trial court cited in support of its factual finding that Sterling 
Jones never granted Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property are either 
wholly unrelated to the inquiry into permissive use, or are easily explained by looking at 
the actual context of the witnesses statements. 
For example, Marilyn Argyle, testified that she had always (since childhood) 
believed the property belonged to her father and her grandfather before that while Sterling 
Jones's testimony was that prior to 1957 he believed that Charles Arygle owned the 
property. The trial court believed these statements to be inconsistent. 
However, the question posed to Marilyn Arygle at trial was "And what is your 
understanding with regard to that [the disputed] property?" [R. 239:16-17]. Marilyn 
Argyle answered "My understanding is that it was a patent that my great grandfather had. 
Then it was my understanding that it was my grandfather, David Jones's property, and 
that then it was my father's property." [R. 239:18-22]. The interlocutor did not ask what 
Marilyn Argyle's understanding was when she was a child, or teenager, or young adult. 
Marilyn Argyle's answer clearly reflects her current understanding of the ownership of 
the disputed property. When viewed in this light, there is no inconsistency between 
Sterling Jones historic belief about ownership before purchasing the disputed property in 
1961 and his daughter's current understanding about ownership. The trial court's finding 
that these statements were "inconsistent" is unfounded and based upon faulty reasoning. 
More importantly, even if these statements were inconsistent, they are entirely irrelevant 
to the question of whether Sterling Jones gave Charles Argyle permission to use the 
disputed property in the early 1960's. 
In similar fashion, the trial court points to the alleged contradictory testimony 
provided by Sterling Jones and Sterling Argyle concerning when the former told the latter 
that he had purchased the disputed property. When the judge (who was posing the 
questions at that stage) specifically asked Sterling Jones when he had told his son-in-law 
that Appellants owned the property, Sterling Jones stated he did not know. When pressed 
by the trial court, Sterling Jones indicated that he was "just guessing," but that it could 
have been 1998 or 1997. [R. 214:24 through 215:25]. In fact, Sterling Jones precise 
answer was, "I'm just, Fm just guessing at that. But I.. .He's, he's pretty well been 
involved there for longer than that. But I may have told him that, I thought I told him that 
I, that I had a tax deed on it." [R. 215:13-16]. 
Given the fact that Appellants are in their mid-80s, it is hardly surprising that their 
memories are not always crystal clear. What's more important is the fact that Sterling 
Jones' gave an obvious qualified answer to the judge's question. Sterling Jones said that 
he did not know and was just guessing. In fact, it is conceivable that Sterling Jones spoke 
to his son-in-law on several occasions over the course of the past 40 years about the 
ownership of the property. 
In any case, the trial court's reliance upon this type of qualified testimony in 
finding Appellants' testimony "contradictory" is highly questionable. Once again, 
though, the parties' testimony on this issue has no bearing on the question of whether 
Sterling Argyle gave Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property. 
As to Dorothy Jones' testimony, Appellants acknowledge that she was nervous on 
the stand and had difficulty remembering some events. What was clear from her 
testimony, however, was the fact that she did remember when her husband notified her 
that he had granted Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property. Mrs. Jones 
provided credible details in her testimony such as the fact that the conversation occurred 
in the morning after Sterling Jones had returned from feeding the horses that were 
corralled south of the disputed property. [R. 224:6-7]. Dorothy Jones also stated that she 
remembers being quite angry because she thought that her and her husband could make 
use of the land. [R. 223:6-18]. 
The trial court was correct in stating that Appellants did not inform Appellee or 
Appellee's immediate predecessor that Appellants owned the disputed land. This, 
however, is entirely understandable given the fact that Sterling Jones quit farming before 
Richard Argyle came into possession of the northern properties in 1997. [R. 213:17 
through 214:23]. If Sterling Jones had simply orally agreed to allow Charles Argyle use 
of the disputed property in 1963, there would have been no reason for Mr. Jones to revisit 
the issue during the period that Charles Argyle had used the land. Sterling Jones testified 
at trial that his son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, took over "running" the disputed property. [R. 
214:5-9]. 
It is not surprising that none of Charles Argyle's family were allegedly unaware 
that the disputed property belonged to Sterling Jones. During trial, Appellee and other 
family members simply refused to accept the fact that the Argyle family never held actual 
title to the disputed property even in light of evidence to that effect. [R. 88:12 through 
89:12; 167:17 through 168:6]. Appellee and other members of his family were in absolute 
denial that the deeds to their northern properties never actually included the disputed 
property. Even if Charles Argyle never told his family that Sterling Jones claimed he had 
purchased the disputed property in 1961, Sterling Jones' own testimony that he had 
informed Charles Argyle of the purchase is not made less believable. 
From the outset of this case, Sterling Jones has affirmed that he spoke to Charles 
Argyle after purchasing the disputed property at a tax sale. [See Affidavit of Sterling 
Jones in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment submitted May 30, 2001, 
attached hereto as Addendum "11," p. 3, ^ J 7]. 
While on the stand during trial, Sterling Jones gave specific details concerning his 
discussion with Charles Argyle during which he granted Mr. Argyle permission to use the 
property. [R. 192:20 through 193:9]. Sterling Jones indicated the time of day that the 
discussion occurred and the reasons why he wanted Charles Argyle to continue using the 
property (namely because the disputed property was not large enough to support Mr. 
Jones' livestock and because there was insufficient water for the livestock). [R. 197:21 
through 198:4; 194:5-12]. Sterling Jones further testified that he had believed that he and 
Charles Argyle had been on good terms and wanted to continue having an amicable 
relationship. Sterling Jones stated that he went home and told his wife, Dorothy Jones, 
about the discussion during breakfast and that she was displeased because she believed 
they could make use of the property. As Sterling Jones provided this testimony, there was 
no hesitancy at all in his responses. 
Sterling Argyle's testimony that his father-in-law told him that he granted Charles 
•Argyle permission to use the disputed property was unrebutted. 
The trial court failed to consider another very important fact that strongly indicates 
that Sterling Jones had told his family that the disputed property belonged to Appellants. 
Even before Appellee filed the initial complaint in this action, Marilyn Argyle and 
Sterling Argyle contacted their attorneys because the wanted to prevent Appellee and his 
family from riding their ATC vehicles over the north part of the disputed property. 
Appellee's counsel issued a Notice to Quit Premises to Plaintiff on March 20, 2001. 
[Addendum "3," p. 6, % 29]. Appellants and their daughter and son-in-law obviously 
knew that the disputed property belonged to Appellants or else they would have not 
prepared a Notice to Quit Premises to be served on Appellee. 
Sterling Jones testified at trial that he has been employed as a teacher, a Utah 
County Road supervisor, a Chief Deputy Sheriff, and was appointed a Justice of the 
Peace. [R. 185:6-16]. There was no direct testimony offered by any witness at trial that 
casts suspicion upon Sterling Jones' unreserved and direct testimony that he granted 
Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property. To the contrary, all testimony 
affirms the fact that Sterling Jones did, in fact, grant Charles Argyle permission to use the 
property. 
The trial court's factual finding that Sterling Jones did not grant Charles Argyle 
permission to use the property is totally insupportable. As pointed out, the trial court 
focused on irrelevant testimony in reaching its conclusion. The trial court's charge that 
the testimony was "contrived" and "contradictory" has been shown to be baseless. The 
undisputed testimony of Appellant Sterling Jones is that he had a conversation with 
Charles Argyle after purchasing the disputed property in 1961. During that conversation, 
Sterling Jones granted Mr. Argyle permission to use the disputed property. The clear 
weight of evidence militates for a finding that this conversation, indeed, occurred. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court and find that the trial court's finding on 
the issue of permissive use is "clearly erroneous." 
7. The trial court erred in awarding Appellee attorney's fees and costs for having 
to respond to Appellants' Rule 52(b) Motion. 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law reviewed under a 
correction-of-error standard AK&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v Aspen Constr , 
977 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In applying the correction-of-error standard, no 
particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. See Orton v 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). While a trial court is granted some measure of 
discretion in awarding attorney's fees (see Salmon v Davis County», 916 P.2d 890, 892 
(Utah, 1996)), an award of attorney fees "must be based on the evidence and supported by 
findings of fact." Cottonwood Mall Co v Sine, 830 P 2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992). 
In the instant case, the trial court erroneously ordered Appellants to pay $1000 00 
to Appellee because Appellee was compelled to respond to Appellants' Rule 52(b) 
motion Attorney's fees are generally recoverable in Utah only when authorized by statute 
or contract. See Groberg v Housing Opportunities, Inc, 2003 UT App 67, 68 P.3d 1015, 
Tf 13 Neither Appellee nor the trial court, however, cited any statutory or contractual 
basis for the award of attorney's fees. Appellee did not invoke Utah R. Civ. P. 11 or Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-56—and the trial court did not intimate that Appellants' Rule 52(b) 
motion was made in bad faith or otherwise 
Utah R Civ P 52(b) provides 
Amendment Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and 
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may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions 
tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising 
the question has made in the district court an objection to such findings or has 
made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a 
new trial. 
Appellants did only what was permitted under Rule 52(b). The trial court 
mistakenly suggests that "Defendants' arguments appear to be a rebuttal to the Court's 
memorandum decision and not a proper Rule 52 motion to amend the findings of fact." 
[Addendum "6," p. 2]. However, an objective reading of the relevant documents (i.e. the 
Amended Findings of Fact, Appellants' Rule 52 motion and the subsequent memoranda 
filed by the respective parties) establishes that Appellants were addressing specific issues 
that the trial court had failed to address or consider in its Amended Findings of Fact. For 
example, the trial court recognized that the original fence built by Sterling Jones 
"functioned as a horse corral" to pen in Sterling Jones' horses. [Addendum "4," p. 3]. As 
part of their Rule 52(b) motion, Appellants asked the trial court to reconsider specific case 
law concerning animal enclosures in conjunction with the doctrine of "boundary by 
acquiescence" [Addendum "2," pp. 6-7]. Appellants also requested in their Rule 52(b) 
motion that the trial court reassess the alleged "contradictory testimony" offered by 
Appellants' witnesses. [Addendum "2," pp. 8-9]. 
Appellants were entitled to make motion upon the trial court to reconsider certain 
facts and legal points that arose in the course of trial pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 52. The 
trial court, without justification, penalized Appellants for exercising a right granted by 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52. Furthermore, the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees in this 
case creates a "chilling effect" inasmuch as it implies that any party who seeks a Rule 
52(b) amendment of fact or law risks having to pay the nonmoving party attorney's fees 
even when there is no statutory or contractual basis for those fees. 
The trial court decision contravenes Utah's general rule that attorney's fees are 
generally not recoverable in Utah except where authorized by statute or contract. 
Furthermore, the trial court's decision is not "based on the evidence and supported by 
findings of fact." This Court should reverse the trial court's decision as legally 
insupportable under the correction-of-error standard. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Appellee failed to establish "mutual acquiescence" at the trial court level because: 
(1) the boundary line was disputed and Appellant Sterling Jones do not "recognize" or 
accept the line, but instead agreed to ascertain the correct boundary line, (2) the fence-line 
that was claimed by Appellee to mark a boundary was merely part of the Appellants' 
horse-corral and was constructed as an enclosure for Appellants' horses and was not 
intended to demarcate a boundary line, (3) Appellants became aware of the "true" 
boundaries of the disputed property after purchasing the disputed property in 1961, (4) the 
trial court effectively converting Appellee's boundary by acquiescence claim into an 
adverse possession claim, which allowed Appellee to avoid the property tax requirement, 
(5) Appellants also made some use of the disputed property. On one, or more of these 
grounds, this Court should reverse the trial court's finding that Appellee proved the 
requisite elements of his boundary by acquiescence claim. This Court should order that 
Appellants retain true and rightful ownership of their property. 
The trial court's factual finding that Sterling Jones never gave Charles Argyle 
permission to use the disputed property after Sterling Jones purchased the property in 
1961 was "clearly erroneous" in light of the testimony and evidence provided at trial. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's factual finding on this issue. This Court should 
further find that because Sterling Jones granted permission to Charles Argyle to use the 
disputed property, Appellee's boundary by acquiescence claim must fail 
The trial court had no basis for awarding Appellee attorney's fees and costs for 
having to respond to Appellants' Rule 52(b) Motion. This Court should reverse the trial 
court's ruling on this matter and order Appellee to disgorge any payment made by 
Appellants for such. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
If this Court reverses the trial court's decision and rules that Appellee failed to 
prove his boundary by acquiescence claim, this Court should order the trial court to 
consider Appellants "unlawful detainer" and "waste" claims. 
Respectfully submitted this £LS day of October, 2004. 
ASCIONJE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C. 
ley for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Jere Reneer (7967) 
Lee Fisher (8925) 
RENEER & ASSOCIATES 
324 North Main 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Telephone (801) 798-3574 
Facsimile (801) 798-3576 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER ARGYLE, 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
vs. : ORDER 
STERLING D. JONES, DOROTHY P. JONES, : (MO^NW) 3 
and JOHN DOES 1 -5, Civil No. -624400226 
Judge: Laycock 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on regularly for trial on June 24, 2003 and June 27, 2003. Plaintiff Roger 
Argyle was present and represented by counsel Jere Reneer. Defendants Sterling D. Jones and 
Dorothy P. Jones were present and represented by Justin R. Elswick and Justin Heideman. The 
parties' stipulated prior to trial that all of the elements needed to establish plaintiffs claim of a 
prescriptive easement had been established except the adverse element. The parties also stipulated 
prior to the trial that the parties are adjoining landowners and that the disputed land had been 
occupied by the plaintiff for a sufficiently long period of time and that the third and fourth elements 
of boundary by acquiescence were established. The only issues remaining to establish plaintiffs claim 
of a boundary by acquiescence were occupation up to a visible line and mutual acquiescence. 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Ceurt 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
t ^ 0 4 - l ^ - ^ Deputy 
The Court having heard testimony, received evidence, and heard argument, being duly 
informed, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendants are the record owners of the disputed property. 
2. Land owned by the plaintiff Roger Argyle and his predecessors in interest abuts the northern 
border of the disputed property. 
3. Defendants Sterling P. Jones and Dorothy P. Jones own land, which abuts the southern border 
of the disputed property. 
4. Currently, there is an electric or hot-wire fence between defendants' property to the south and 
the disputed property. To the south of this electric or hot-wire fence are a wooden fence and a metal, 
mesh fence. The eastern side of the property is marked by a fence, which runs north from defendants' 
southern property to the river ("eastern fence"). The western boundary of the disputed property is 
demarcated by a fence, which runs north from defendants' southern property to plaintiffs northern 
property ("western fence"). Prior to the western fence being built, a road marked this boundary of the 
property. 
5. The disputed property does not constitute the entire parcel which defendants own of record. A 
small section to the east of the disputed property is not claimed by plaintiff. This area is marked as 
parcel E on defendants' exhibit #1, and the hay wagon and silage pit are located on this piece of 
property. 
6. Located within the disputed area is an artesian well, and a pipe that runs through the ground to 
the covered canal. 
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7. Charles Argyle, the plaintiffs grandfather, believed that he purchased the disputed property 
sometime in 1953 from George Foster or his wife. 
8. Defendant Sterling Jones believed that Charles Argyle owned the property prior to 1957. 
9. In approximately 1957, the canal company decided to develop and improve the canal system 
that abutted portions of the southern and western sides of the disputed property. 
10. Due to the relocation of the canal, a dispute arose between Charles Argyle and defendant 
Sterling Jones as to the appropriate location of the boundary line between the disputed property and 
defendants' southern property. 
11. In approximately 1958, defendant Sterling Jones installed the wooden southern fence. This 
southern fence is the wooden fence that is south of the disputed property and north of the defendants 
property. At the time of the installation of this fence, the parties were unaware of the true boundary 
line between their properties. 
12. Charles Argyle did not object to this fence and the parties continued to treat this fence as the 
property line from 1958 through the commencement of this action in 200 L 
13. Before checking the bounds of his property against the Utah County Plats, Defendant Sterling 
Jones build the southern fence in 1958, and this fence line was used by both parties for over forty 
years. 
14. Charles Argyle died in September 1997. Richard Argyle, plaintiffs younger brother, 
purchased all of Charles Argyle's property, which he believed included the disputed area. 
15. In the spring of 1998, Richard Argyle built a fence along the western border of the disputed 
property (western fence). 
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16. Richard Argyle died in January 1999. Richard left his real property, which he believed 
included the disputed, in a trust, which named plaintiffs parents as beneficiaries. 
17. Plaintiffs parents quitclaimed their interest in the property, including their perceived interest 
in the disputed property, to plaintiff sometime after his brother's death. 
18. In either 2000 or 2001, plaintiff ran an electrical or hot-wire fence between the disputed 
property and defendants' property to the south. 
19. In either 2000 or 2001, defendants' son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, built a metal, mesh fence that 
paralleled the wooden fence on the south border of the disputed property. 
20. Since 1953, plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have used the disputed property as a 
-shooting range, pasture and recreation area. They have also rented the disputed property to non-
parties for pasturing. Specifically, plaintiff and his predecessors in interest rented the disputed 
property to Joe Bybee from approximately 1991-2001. 
21. The river has washed out the northeastern portion of the disputed parcel. Plaintiff has 
attempted to reclaim this portion of the property by backfilling the area. 
22. Many people understood that the disputed property was owned and knew that the property 
was occupied by plaintiff and his predecessors in interest. These people are Joy Christmas (a 
neighbor), Dan Poulsen (a neighbor), Daniel Poulsen (a neighbor), Bill Argyle, Olive Clayson 
(plaintiffs aunt), Sterling H. Argyle (plaintiffs uncle), and Lois Argyle (plaintiffs mother). 
23. On April 8, 2000, a fire broke out on the Sorensens' property, which located east of the 
disputed property. The fire jumped the river and ignited certain portions of the disputed property. At 
the time of the fire Daniel Poulsen, who is a neighbor to the parties, witnessed a conversation 
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between Sterling Argyle, defendant's son in law, and a fireman. The fireman asked who owned the 
disputed property. Sterling Argyle replied that plaintiff owned it. 
24. Plaintiff rented equipment and expended time to clean up the disputed property after the fire. 
25. The plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have always occupied the disputed property up to 
a visible line. The visible line begins at the northwestern corner of the property and follows the road, 
later the western fence, to the south where it is met by the wooden fence which runs to the east and 
connects to the eastern fence. The eastern fence runs north to the edge of the river, then along the 
edge of the river until reaching plaintiffs northern property. 
26. Since 1953, defendants' use of the disputed area has been limited to maintaining portions of 
the southern fence and maintaining the artesian well. Defendants' son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, had 
minimal contact with the disputed area for these purposes and defendant Sterling Jones had little, if 
any, contact with the disputed area. 
27. Defendant Sterling Jones checked the property descriptions in 1961. At that time, he 
discovered that neither he nor Charles Argyle were the record owners of the disputed property, and 
that the disputed property was noticed for a tax sale. 
28. On May 24, 1961, without informing Charles Argyle, defendants purchased the disputed 
property at the tax sale for $7.00. 
29. All testimony regarding a conversation between Charles Argyle and Sterling Jones regarding 
Jones' purchase of the disputed property at a tax sale in 1961 is contrived and unconvincing. 
30. The Court finds that the defendants never gave Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed 
property because the conversation never occurred. 
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31. Defendant Sterling Jones never told the plaintiff, his brother Richard, or their father Ron that 
defendant was the record owner of the disputed property. 
32. The understanding of Charles Argyle and his successors in interest, including plaintiff, was 
that the wooden fence erected in approximately 1958 by defendant Sterling Jones was the correct 
boundary line between the properties. 
33. The testimony of defendants and their witnesses was unconvincing and sometimes 
contradictory. There was little agreement between the testimony of the defendants' witnesses and the 
defendants' testimony. Witnesses were excluded from the court during the trial and, therefore, did not 
know what others had testified. 
a. In particular, there was contradictory testimony as to when certain alleged 
conversations took place. Defendant Sterling Jones testified that he told his son-in-law Sterling 
Argyle about the permissive use about five or six years ago while Sterling Argyle testified that 
defendant Sterling Jones told him about the permissive use in 1962 or 1963. 
b. Defendant Dorothy Jones repeatedly testified, "I don't know" or "I don't remember" 
when questioned about a 1962 or 1963 conversation with her husband, defendant Sterling Jones, 
regarding the permissive use. It is obvious to the Court that defendant Dorothy Jones did not have a 
clear recollection (if any) of this alleged conversation regarding permissive use. 
c. The defendants' daughter testified that she had thought since childhood that the 
disputed property belonged to her father and her grandfather before that. This is contradicted by 
defendant Sterling Jones's testimony that he believed that Charles Argyle owned the property prior to 
1957. 
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34. Sometime in 2000, Sterling Argyle told plaintiff that defendant Sterling Jones was the rightful 
owner of the property. Defendants did not before that time inform anyone, including the plaintiff or 
his predecessors in interest, that the property defendants claimed the disputed land even though the 
plaintiff and his predecessors in interest were making improvements on and continued to use the 
disputed property. 
35. On March 21, 2000, defendants served plaintiff with a Notice to Quit Premises. The notice to 
quit referenced the disputed property by property description. It is unclear whether plaintiff was 
actually personally served with this notice. 
36. Plaintiff has not vacated (and continues to occupy) the disputed property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff has proven all of the elements of a boundary by acquiescence by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
2. As to the first element of boundary by acquiescence, plaintiff and his predecessors in interest 
have occupied the property up to a visible line and any contacts by defendants with the disputed 
property, including the defendants' son-in-law's cursory contact with the property, are insufficient to 
negate the plaintiffs claim of occupation. 
3. As to the second element of boundary by acquiescence, acquiescence, the plaintiff has proven 
by clear and convincing evidence that the parties have "recognizefd] and treat[ed] an observable line . 
, . as the boundary dividing the [defendants'] property from the [plaintiffs] property. Ault v. Holden, 
2002 UT 33,1f 19, 44 P.3d 781, 788 (Utah 2002). The fact that Charles Argyle was never informed of 
the tax sale purchase, the fact that the most recent fence built by defendant's son-in-law mirrors the 
1958 fence built by defendant, and that the defendants never told any of Charles Argyle's relatives 
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after Charles' death that the land use was permissive bolsters the conclusion that the boundary was 
acquiesced in. 
4. Mutual acquiescence was not destroyed because one party knew the true boundary line of the 
properties. The Court cannot reach the conclusion that mutual acquiescence is destroyed if one party 
has knowledge of the true boundary because it would be contrary to and usurp the purposes of a 
boundary by acquiescence, namely "preventing strife and litigation and promoting stability in 
boundaries." Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078,1080 (Utah 1996)(internal citations and quotation 
omitted). Any application of boundary by acquiescence should promote openness and honesty among 
adjacent landowners, not secrecy and dishonesty. Defendant Sterling Jones failed to disclose that the 
record boundary line was different than the boundary line that was established in approximately 1958 
by the fence that he himself erected. He cannot now claim that there was no acquiescence merely 
because he knew the correct boundary. 
5. The case Nunlev v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117 (Utah 1962), does not apply to this situation. The 
facts of this case are the opposite of the Nunlev decision. In this case, unlike Nunley, plaintiff and 
his predecessors in interest were unaware of the true boundary and there was a boundary dispute in 
approximately 1958 between plaintiffs predecessor in interest and the defendant. In 1958 Defendant 
Sterling Jones built a fence between his property and the disputed area in a location that was accepted 
by both him and Charles Argyle. 
6. The parties stipulated that the occupation of the land had been for a sufficiently long period of 
time and that the parties were adjoining landowners, the third and fourth elements of a boundary by 
acquiescence. 
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7. Since the plaintiff has prevailed on his boundary by acquiescence claim, the Court does not 
need to address the plaintiffs prescriptive easement claim. 
8. Because the Court has found that title should be quieted in the plaintiff, the defendants' 
claims for unlawful detainer and waste are moot. 
9. Plaintiff, having proven a boundary by acquiescence is entitled to a decree quieting title to the 
disputed land. 
ORDER 
1. The plaintiff shall within sixty (60) days at the date of this order, have the disputed 
land surveyed by a land surveyor and, based on that survey, submit an appropriate decree establishing 
the boundary of the disputed land as the fence lines (as described in the Court's Findings of Fact) and 
quieting title in plaintiff. 
DATED jhis3(^day of £ ) ^ ^ i 2003. 
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N O I I C E 
The foregoing ORDER has been submitted to Uu„ four for execution jnd entrv. Rule 4-
5 M ( J I , "i < M I I n l i i i i d l t i . i l ' i i l i i i i i i l ' i . l i i i l i Hi 1II11 ' In i •*'^rcL. ' * • " i 
parties, to submit notice of objection to the Order. If such objcciion as to form is not received within 
the prescribed time period, die OROK1I will be executec ,;\ iii^  i -art. 
Dated this j day of December, 2003. > / 
Jere Mheer 
RENEER & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a tn le and correct copy oi UK, loregoing AMENDED FINDINGS 
QF pACT AND C0NCLUSI0NS QF LAW AND QRDERj on the J^ 0j U/Ct/J&ZZfim, 
to the following: 
Justin R Elswick 
Justin Heideman 
2696 North Uiv 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, UT 84604 
Legal Secretary 
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ADDENDUM 2 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN (USB #8897) 
JUSTIN R. ELSWICK (USB #9153) 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY L.L.C. 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 812-1000 
" f SO 1)374-1724 
. i i. lilt rVf( 'Pi | ; tnts 
IN » I FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF I IT AH 
ROGER ARGYLE, 
P Hiif, 
VS. 
STERLING D. JONES, DOROTHY P. JONES 
and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' RULE 52(b) MOTION 
TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT 
*
vrVTTTDGMEMT 
Case No. 010400893 
Judge: Claudia Laycock 
and submit this Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Judgment entered in this case. 
Specificai. , i ;iendants request that the Court find that: 
1. Because Defendant Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle openly disagreed that the original 
fence line functioned as the correct demarcation line, mutual acquiescence never arose in 
the first instance; 
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2 Mutual acquiescence did not arise when Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle first disputed 
the boundai y line in 1958, and Stei ling Jones' subseqi lent discover) of tl le ti i le boi mdarj 
line prevented mutual acquiescence from ever arising; 
3. The' fence line was built by Sterling Jones as part of his corral and not to establish an 
agreed-i tpoii boi iiidai > line; 
)efendants were entitled to a grant of summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to 
p - perl)' iK'^ ik- i • . : i) of Stei ling [ones that accompanied Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
5 Sterling Jones did, in fact, tell the truth when he offered sworn testimony during trial that 
iu ^». 'h.-nlfs \/.
 M k J j< 1 nroperty for grazing purposes. 
\ Memorandum ol Points and Auiii*>? ihes as required b\ the Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
DATED .this [X day of January, 2004, 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & McK i I: , I I ..C 
Attorney for Defendants 
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JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN (USB #8897) 
JUSTIN R. ELS WICK (USB #9153) 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY L.L.C. 
2696 North University Avert". • ^ui<c 1 *0 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 812-1000 
Fax:(801)374-1724 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH CIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE o p UTAH 
ROGER ARGYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STERLING D. JONES, DOROTHY P. JONES 
and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF RULE 52(b) MOTION 
TO AMEND FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 010400893 
Judii . • ^<> k 
C O M E T I'O'Vi T Defendants in the abo < e-entitled matter ,ll * '• ' "f Ij :;| iht j ni< * " ,,j vri1 iCi il il 1 j •' j ,iin ::| oi :,! 
submit the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Rule 52<\** M< -u>n to A IVI. 
Findings and Judgment. Rule 51(b) oi the Utah Rules ol ( "iviJ ; : ..dure pro\ -ac^ .; . 
lt[ii |pi MI m< >li< HI 'i )\\\ party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly." Pursuant to this 
provision, Defendants respectf i ill} request that tl lis - n i-.i. -M. ' 
arguments and amend its findings and the judgment accordingly. 
Lu N .!,'-., .•„ L J | 
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
In approximately : - i;« -.u. ***h.-u I"IL\J:I... ! * i- S!- •• " - -* IMI • 
develop and improve the canal system that abutted portions of the southern .uui W^RTM sides of 
the disputed property. [See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusion > ^\ I ,a\< U.,. ,io . 
After the relocation of the canal in 1958, Charles Argyle and Sterling Jones had an argument 
regarding the appropriate location of the boundai 3 linebetw er ' : . ute d propei ty and 
Sterling Jones' southern property, [See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order p 11J10] 
V,j \i "'III ill"1 Jiuiii'iin ill Slciliiiip IIMICN ;iiid ( 'hnik^ 'Wvk1 agreed that they would check their 
property descriptions in order to ascertain their true property lines. [See July 25, 2003 
Memorandum Decision, p, ••!, ]\ 1 .*]. 
It is unclear whether the dispute between Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle arose because 
Sterling Jones moved his corral fence-line further north after Lake Shore's development, or 
w'lidfii i lh< ihspiih ,ti< »sr fits! .iinl NIITIHI*.* IOIIOS built the fence thereafter in response to the 
dispute. [See Ruhng on Defendants' Objections to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order an-, i;. Jefendam ^ u-iini 
in 1961, Sterling Jones did check the Utah County Plats and discovered that the disputed 
property was not owned by him or Charles Argyle but was going to be sold at a tax sale. [See 
Ji ily 25. 2003 IVfei 1 a >i 1 in< ii it t 1 E h M i $i< n t. , j Ilr || 1 4]. 
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ARGUMENT 
L Because Defendant Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle openly disagreed that the original 
fence line functioned as a property demarcation, mutual acquiescence never arose in the 
first instance. 
In approximately 1957, the Lake Shore Irrigation company ("Lake Shore") decided that it would 
develop and improve the canal system that abutted portions of the southern and western sides of the 
disputed property. Although this Court found that it is unclear from trial testimony whether the dispute 
between Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle arose because Sterling Jones moved his corral fence-line 
further north after Lake Shore's development, or whether the dispute arose first and Sterling Jones built 
the fence thereafter in response to the dispute, this Court did affirmatively find that Charles Argyle and 
Sterling Jones had an argument regarding the appropriate location of the boundary line between the 
disputed property and Sterling Jones' southern property. As a result, Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle 
agreed that they would check their property descriptions in order to ascertain their true property lines. 
One of the four elements of a boundary by acquiescence claim is "mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1998) (quoting Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 
1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)). In Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court 
provided a detailed analysis of the element of mutual acquiescence in a boundary by acquiescence claim. 
The court explained: 
Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party attempting to establish a particular 
line as the boundary between properties must establish that the parties mutually acquiesced in 
the line as separating the properties. To do so, the party must show that both parties 
recognized and acknowledged a visible line, such as a fence or building, as the boundary.... 
When the parties agree that the line to which they occupy is not the true line and agree 
subsequently to ascertain the true boundary, the quality of acquiescence is destroyed and no 
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boundary is fixed by continued occupation. 
Indeed, mere conversations between the parties evidencing either an ongoing dispute as to 
the property line or an unwillingness by one of the adjoining landowners to accept the line as 
the boundary refute any allegation that the parties have mutually acquiesced in the line as the 
property demarcation. Id at 788-789 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The last two paragraphs of the above quote are particularly relevant to the facts of the present 
case. In 1958, Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle had an oral argument concerning the correct boundary 
line between the disputed property and Sterling Jones' property to the south. Both agreed to 
subsequently ascertain the true boundary line. SterUng Jones did, in fact, ascertain the true boundary line 
after checking the Utah County Plats. Whether Charles Argyle did or not is unknown. The doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence implies that the adjoining landowners were once uncertain [of the boundary 
lines of the property]. . . and that the boundary was marked on the ground in settlement thereof" 
Stratfordv. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 366 (Utah 1984). If, however, there is an open dispute about the 
boundary line and the parties do not "recognize" or accept a line, but instead agree to ascertain the 
correct boundary line, "the quality of acquiescence is destroyed and no boundary is fixed by continued 
occupation." Even a "mere" conversation evidencing an ongoing dispute between the parties as to the 
property line or unwillingness by even one of the adjoining landowners to accept the line as a boundary 
negates the element of mutual acquiescence in the line as the property demarcation. 
Such a conversation did occur in 1958 between the Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle. Sterling 
Jones and Charles Argyle did agree to subsequently ascertain the true boundary line. Even if this Court 
dismisses the undisputed fact that Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle agreed to check their boundaries, it 
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is obvious from the testimony provided by Sterling Jones that he absolutely did not recognize or accept 
the line as a boundary and expressed this to Charles Argyle. There was no marking of the ground in 
settlement of the boundary dispute. It does not matter that Charles Argyle continued to occupy the 
disputed property up to the fence line if acquiescence did not exist from the start. Because mutual 
acquiescence never arose in the first instance, Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse its 
finding that Plaintiff has established all of the necessary elements of his boundary by acquiescence claim. 
II. Mutual acquiescence did not arise when Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle first 
disputed the boundary line in 1958, and Sterling Jones9 subsequent discovery of the true 
boundary line prevented mutual acquiescence from ever arising. 
"[I]f there is no uncertainty as to the location of the true boundary line the parties may not, 
knowing where the true boundary line is, establish a boundary line by acquiescence at another place." 
Nunley v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117, 122 (1962). "Accordingly, knowledge of the true boundary is relevant 
to a determination of whether a party acquiesced in a particular line as the boundary." Wilkinson Family 
Farm v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229, 231-32 (Utah App. 1999). 
The foregoing language is relevant to the facts of this case because Sterling Jones did 
subsequently discover the true boundary lines of the disputed property after reviewing the Utah County 
Plats. Upon reviewing the Utah County Plats, Sterling Jones purchased the disputed property at a tax 
sale in 1961. Plaintiff provided no affirmative evidence at trial that Sterling Jones was ever uncertain as 
to the boundaries of the disputed property after purchasing the disputed property in 1961. On the 
contrary, Sterling Jones provided testimony that after purchasing the disputed property in 1961, he was 
aware of the disputed property's boundary lines. 
In reaching its initial ruling in this case, the Court has stated that "[m]utual acquiescence cannot 
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be destroyed when one party later learns that a boundary line is incorrect, yet fails to inform the other of 
the discrepancy." [See July 25, 2003 Memorandum Decision, p. 13]. In this case, however, the 
respective parties never mutually acquiesced in a "boundary line." As set forth in the preceding section 
of this memorandum, Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle never agreed upon a set boundary. The fence 
that was built by Sterling Jones was an extension of his horse corral, and was not built in recognition of 
any boundary line. 
Several decisions in Utah have expressly held that sharing the use of one's own property is not 
equivalent to a disclaimer of ownership and that failure to claim to the true line is not equivalent to 
acquiescence. See Brown v. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202 (1951); Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 
267, 209 P.2d 257 (1949); Ringwoodv. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954). More 
recently, the Ault court has held that "record property owners are not required to take legal action, or 
otherwise "oust" someone adversely occupying their property to maintain their legal rights in the 
property. Ault, 44 P.3d 781 at 789. This Court may disbelieve Sterling Jones' statement that he notified 
Charles Argyle of the fact that he had purchased the disputed property. Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that after purchasing the disputed property, Sterling Jones became aware of his true property boundaries 
and thereafter, could not "acquiesce" or accept the southern fence line as a legitimate boundary. 
Additionally, it has been held that where a fence or other monument which is claimed to mark a 
boundary is not actually intended to be a boundary, but is erected for some other purpose, there can be 
no boundary by acquiescence. See Holmes v. Judge, 31 Utah 269, 87 P. 1009 (1906); Wright v. 
Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1974); Ringwoodv. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053 (1954). 
The testimony of Sterling Jones, Sterling Argyle, and Plaintiff at trial was that the fence erected by 
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Sterling Jones on the southern border of the disputed property is actually part of Sterling Jones' corral, 
which lies directly south of the disputed property. The fence was erected when Sterling Jones attempted 
to extend his corral fence line north onto the disputed property. At trial, Sterling Jones testified that he 
had believed that Lake Shore had granted him an additional section of land directly north of his corral in 
exchange land that he had granted to Lake Shore running along the western side of his corral. 
The fence is still in existence today and functions as a corral to keep Defendants' horses in. The 
fence line that divides the disputed property from Sterling Jones' southern property was not built in 
acquiescence of the boundary dispute between him and Charles Argyle, but as part of Sterling Jones' 
corral. 
III. Defendants were entitled to a grant of summary judgment on their Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed July 16, 2002 because Plaintiff failed to fiie counter-affidavits 
sufficient to raise an issue of material fact on the issue of "permission." 
When a party has submitted a motion for summary judgment and the motion is supported by 
affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the non-moving party has an 
affirmative duty to respond with affidavits in order to establish that a genuine issue of material fact does 
exist See Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). 
On July 16, 2002, Defendants submitted a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. Therein, 
Defendants specifically argued that Sterling Jones granted Charles Argyle permission to use the property 
and that Charles Argyle was notified of the 1961 purchase of the disputed property. [See Defendants' 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 9-
10]. This assertion was supported by Sterling Jones own affidavit, which was attached to the foregoing 
memorandum as Exhibit "A." Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition filed on September 24, 2002 
Page 7 of 12 
twice denies Defendants' assertion that Sterling Jones granted Charles Argyle permission to use the 
disputed property after 1961. However, neither of these denials was supported by valid affidavit 
testimony. Upon motion by Defendants, this Court struck many of Ronald Argyle's affidavit statements 
in its Ruling dated January 7, 2003. 
Rule 56(e) states in relevant part that "[wjhen a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule [i.e. by affidavit,] an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." This Court in its Ruling dated January 
7, 2003 refused to grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment because it found that "whether 
defendants granted plaintiff and his predecessors permission to use and occupy the disputed property" 
was a disputed issue of material fact. [See January 7, 2003 Ruling, p. 4]. Defendants, however, are 
unable to locate any specific facts set forth in the affidavits that accompanied Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition that established that Sterling Jones did not, in fact, grant Charles Axgyle permission to use the 
disputed property after purchasing said property in 1961. Because Plaintiff failed to offer any affidavit 
testimony countering Sterling Jones' sworn affidavit statement, this Court should have granted 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
IV. Defendants request that this Court reassess the credibility of Defendants' trial witnesses 
and their testimonies, and in particular, the testimony of Sterling Jones. 
From the earliest stages of this case, Sterhng Jones has affirmed that he spoke to Charles Argyle 
after purchasing the disputed property at a tax sale. [See Affidavit of Sterling Jones in Support of 
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Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment submitted May 30, 2001, p. 3, f 7]. While on the stand 
during trial, Sterling Jones gave specific details concerning his discussion with Charles Argyle during 
which he granted Mr. Argyle permission to use the property. Sterling Jones indicated the time of day 
that the discussion occurred and the reasons why he wanted Charles Argyle to continue using the 
property (namely because the disputed property was not large enough to support Mr. Jones' livestock 
and because there was insufficient water for the livestock). Sterling Jones further testified that he had 
believed that he and Charles Argyle had been on good terms and wanted to continue having an amicable 
relationship. Sterling Jones stated that he went home and told his wife, Dorothy Jones, about the 
discussion during breakfast and that she was displeased because she believed they could make use of the 
property. As Sterling Jones provided this testimony, there was no hesitancy at all in his responses. Most 
importantly, there was no evidence presented that 
This Court points to "contradictory testimony" as part of its reason for finding that Sterling 
Jones's testimony regarding the grant of permission to Charles Argyle was untrue. Specifically, the 
Court notes: (a) That Sterling Jones testified that he told his son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, about the 
permissive use approximately five or six years earlier while Sterling Argyle testified that Sterling Jones 
told him about the permissive use in 1962 or 1963; (b) Dorothy Jones testified "I don't know" or "I 
don't remember" when questioned about the 1962 or 1963 conversation with her husband, Sterling 
Jones, regarding the permissive use; (c) Sterling Jones's daughter testified that she had believed since 
childhood that the disputed property belonged to her father and her grandfather before that, although 
Sterling Jones testified that he believed that Charles Argyle had owned the property prior to 1957; and 
(d) Defendants did not inform anyone, including Plaintiff or his predecessors in interest, that the 
Page 9 of 12 
Defendants claimed the disputed land even though the Plaintiff and his predecessors made 
improvements on and continued to use the property. 
None of these points, however, are necessarily contradictory and none of these points establish 
that Sterling Jones lied under oath when he testified that he gave Charles Argyle permission to use the 
disputed property. When this Court asked Sterling Jones during trial what year he spoke to his son-in-
law about the permissive use, Mr. Jones stated that he really could not recall the exact year. Sterling 
Jones then posited that it might have been 5 or 6 years previous when he was considering dividing the 
property. However, Mr. Jones stated that he could only guess as to the exact date. Sterling Jones firmly 
stated during trial that he could not remember when he spoke to his son-in-law about the issue. 
Furthermore, it is possible that Sterling Jones did tell his son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, in 1962 or 1963 
about the grant of permission. The two may have spoken more than once about Charles Argyle's 
permissive use over a period of approximately 40 years. Defendants respectfully ask this Court to 
consider whether it is more likely that the two statements are reconcilable or whether Sterling Jones and 
Sterling Argyle must have given false information under oath at trial. 
As to Dorothy Jones' testimony, Defendants acknowledge that she was nervous on the stand and 
had difficulty remembering some events. What was clear from her testimony, however, was the fact that 
she did remember when her husband notified her that he had granted Charles Argyle permission to use 
the disputed property. Mrs. Jones provided credible details in her testimony such as the fact that the 
conversation occurred in the morning after Sterling Jones had returned from feeding the horses that were 
corralled south of the disputed property. Dorothy Jones also stated that she remembers being quite angry 
because she thought that her and her husband could make use of the land. 
Page 10 of 12 
Sterling Jones' daughter, Marilyn Argyle, testified that she had always believed the disputed 
property belonged to her father and her grandfather because she used to play on an abandoned vehicle 
situated on the disputed property. This statement does not contradict Sterling Jones' statement that he 
had believed the disputed property belonged to Charles Argyle prior to 1957. Marilyn Argyle testified 
that she could not recall exactly why she believed that disputed property belonged to her family, but 
thought that it was because her grandfather had told her so at one time. Her statement merely reflects 
her personal belief. Her father, Sterling Jones, may have held a different belief. 
The Court is correct in stating that Defendants did not inform Plaintiff or Richard Argyle 
(Plaintiffs immediate predecessor) that Defendants claimed the disputed land. This, however, is entirely 
understandable given the fact that Sterhng Jones quit farming before Richard came into possession of the 
Argyle properties in 1997. If Sterling Jones had simply orally agreed to allow Charles Argyle use of the 
disputed property in 1963, there would have been no reason for Mr. Jones to revisit the issue during the 
period that Charles Argyle had used the land. Sterling Jones testified at trial that his son-in-law, Sterling 
Argyle, took over "running" the disputed property. Sterling Jones testified that he did tell Plaintiff in 
2000 that the disputed property belonged to his father-in-law. 
It is not surprising that none of Charles Argyle's family were allegedly unaware that the disputed 
property belonged to Sterling Jones. During trial, Plaintiff simply refused to accept the fact that the 
Argyle family never held actual title to the disputed property. Even if Charles Argyle never told his 
family that Sterling Jones claimed he had purchased the disputed property in 1961, Sterling Jones own 
testimony that he had informed Charles Argyle of the purchase is not made less believable. 
The Court did not consider another very important fact that strongly indicates that Sterling Jones 
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had told his family that the disputed property belonged to Defendants. Even before Plaintiff filed the 
initial complaint in this action, Marilyn Argyle and Sterling Argyle contacted their present counsel 
because the wanted to prevent Plaintiff and his family from riding their ATC vehicles over the north part 
of the disputed property. Defendants' counsel issued a Notice to Quit Premises to Plaintiff on March 20, 
2001. Defendants and their daughter and son-in-law obviously knew that the property belonged to 
Defendants or else they would have not prepared a Notice to Quit Premises to be served on Plaintiff. 
Sterling Jones testified at trial that he has been employed as a teacher, a Utah County Road 
supervisor, a Chief Deputy Sheriff, and was appointed a Justice of the Peace. This Court has chosen to 
accept as true Sterling Jones testimony regarding events leading up to the discussion between him and 
Charles Argyle in 1963, but disbelieve any testimony offered by Sterling Jones thereafter. A 
reassessment of those testimonies shows that they are not necessarily in conflict. At any rate, there was 
no testimony offered by any witness at trial that casts suspicion upon Sterling Jones' unreserved and 
direct testimony that he granted Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that this Court reconsider the law and 
facts presented in this case and upon such reconsideration, enter judgment in favor of Defendants as to 
the disputed property. 
DATED this )JU day of January, 2004. 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C 
JpSfflM R. ELSWICK, 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Jere Reneer 
RENEER & ASSOCIATES 
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Hand delivery 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L. L. C 
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CASE NO 010400893 
DATE. July2$T2003 
Judge Laycock 
This matter came on regularly for trial before Judge Laycock on June 24, 2003 and June 
27, 2003. Plaintiff Roger Argyle was present and represented by counsel Jere Reneer. 
Defendants Sterling D. Jones and Dorothy P. Jones were present and represented by Justin R. 
Elswick and Justin Heideman. The Court, having heard testimony, having received evidence, and 
being duly informed therefrom, enters the following ruling. 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter concerns a dispute between two property owners as to the rightful 
ownership of a certain parcel of property located in Lakeshore, Utah ("disputed parcel"). In its 
ruling dated January 7, 2003, this Court found that defendants Sterling D. Jones and Dorothy P. 
Jones ("defendants") are the record owners of the disputed parcel and that the limited issues to be 
addressed at trial were plaintiff Roger Argyle's ("plaintiff') claims of boundary by acquiescence 
and prescriptive easement 
Prior to the presentation of evidence at the trial on June 24, 2003, the parties stipulated 
to the following (1) that all of the elements needed to establish prescriptive easement had been 
established except the adverse element, and (2) that the third and fourth elements of boundary by 
acquiescence had been established, but the first two elements of boundary by acquiescence, i.e., 
occupation up to a visible line and mutual acquiescence, were still disputed. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendants are the record owners of what is designated as K727-1 on defendants' 
exhibit #ll 
2. The disputed parcel is outlined in red on defendants' exhibit #1 and was labeled by 
the parties as parcel C. 
3. Plaintiff and his predecessors in interest own property which is located to the north 
of the disputed parcel. Plaintiffs parcels are marked as A, Bl, or B2 on defendants' exhibit #1 
("northern property"). 
4. Either plaintiffs Bl or B2 parcels abut the northern border of the disputed property. 
5. Defendants own land which is located to the south of the disputed property 
("southern property"). This property abuts the disputed property. 
6. Currently, there is an electric or hot-wire fence between defendants' property to the 
south and the disputed property. To the south of this electric or hot wire fence are a wooden 
fence and a metal, mesh fence. The eastern side of the disputed property is marked by a fence 
1
 During trial, the parties continually referred to defendants' exhibit #1 as exhibit #3. 
However, the plat map, which many of the witnesses drew on, is marked as defendants' exhibit 
#1. 
which runs north from defendants' southern property to the river ("eastern fence").2 Defendants' 
hay wagon and silage pit are located to the east of this fence. The western boundary of the 
disputed property is demarcated by a fence which runs north from defendants' southern property 
to plaintiffs northern property ("western fence"). 
7. The disputed property does not constitute the entire parcel which defendants own of 
record. A small section to the east of the disputed property is not claimed by plaintiff. This area 
is marked as parcel E on defendants' exhibit #1, and both the hay wagon and silage pit are located 
on this piece of property. 
8. Located within the disputed area is an artesian well,3 which defendants assert has 
been maintained by their son-in-law Sterling Argyle. 
9. Plaintiff and various other witnesses testified that Charles Argyle, plaintiffs 
grandfather, purchased the disputed property sometime in 1953 from George Foster or his wife. 
10. Defendant Sterling Jones testified that prior to 1957 he believed that Charlie Argyle 
owned the disputed property. 
11. In approximately 1957, the canal company decided to develop and improve the 
canal system that abutted portions of the southern and western sides of the disputed property. 
2
 Defendant Sterling Jones testified that the eastern fence was in place before he purchased 
the disputed property in 1961. 
3
 There was testimony that this artesian well consists of a pipe which runs through the 
ground into the covered canal. 
12. Due to the relocation of the canal, a dispute arose between Charles Argyle and 
defendant Sterling Jones as to the appropriate location of the boundary line between the disputed 
property and defendants' southern property. Defendant Sterling Jones testified that the parties 
decided to check the property descriptions and then resolve the dispute. 
13. Defendant Sterling Jones testified that Charles Argyle never acted to resolve the 
dispute. So, a year later, in approximately 1958, defendant Sterling Jones reinstalled the southern 
fence. 
14. For reasons which were not explained at trial, defendant Sterling Jones did not 
check the property descriptions until 1961. At that time, he discovered that neither he nor 
Charles Argyle were the record owners of the disputed property, and that the disputed property 
was noticed for a tax sale. 
15. On May 24, 1961, without informing Charles Argyle, defendants purchased the 
disputed property at the tax sale for $7.00. 
16. Defendant Sterling Jones testified that after this purchase he approached Charles 
Argyle and informed him that he, Sterling Jones, was now the record owner of the disputed 
property. Defendant testified that he gave Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed 
property until he wanted it or needed it. 
17. When asked by opposing counsel at trial what Charles Argyle's reaction to this 
news was, defendant Sterling Jones stated that Charles Argyle said nothing and the two never 
talked about the dispute again 
18. Charles Argyle died in September 1997. After his death, the property was 
purchased by Richard Argyle, plaintiffs younger brother. 
19. In the spring of 1998, Richard Argyle built a fence along the western border of the 
disputed property (previously referred to as the western fence). 
20. Defendant Sterling Jones never told the plaintiff or his brother Richard or their 
father Ron that he was the rightful owner of the disputed property. 
21. Richard Argyle passed away in January 1999. Richard left the disputed property in 
a trust which named plaintiffs parents as beneficiaries. 
22. Plain tiffs parents quit-claimed the disputed property to plaintiff sometime after his 
brother's death. 
23. On April 8, 2000, a fire broke out on the Sorensens5 property, which is located east 
of the disputed property. Plaintiff testified that the fire "jumped" the river and ignited certain 
portions of the disputed property. 
24. Daniel Poulsen, who is a neighbor to the parties, testified that during the fire he 
heard a fireman ask Sterling Argyle who owned the disputed property. Daniel Poulsen testified 
that Sterling Argyle answered that the disputed property belonged to plaintiff. 
25. Plaintiff rented equipment and expended time to clean up the disputed parcel after 
the fire 
26. In either 2000 or 2001, plaintiff ran an electrical or hot wire fence between the 
disputed property and defendants' property to the south 
27. In either 2000 or 2001, defendants' son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, built a metal, mesh 
fence which paralleled the wooden fence on the south border of the disputed property. 
28. Sometime in 2000, Sterling Argyle informed plaintiff that defendant Sterling Jones 
was the rightful owner of the disputed property. 
29. On March 21, 2001, defendants served plaintiff with a Notice to Quit Premises. 
The notice to quit referenced the disputed property by property description.4 
30. To date, plaintiff has not vacated the disputed property. 
31. Since 1953, plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have used the disputed 
property as a shooting range, pasture and recreation area. 
32. Since 1953, defendants' use of the property has been limited to maintaining 
portions of the southern fence and maintaining the artesian well. 
33. Since acquiring the land in 1999, plaintiff has rented the disputed property to non-
parties for pasturing. Specifically, plaintiff and his predecessors in interest rented the disputed 
property to Joe Bybee from approximately 1991-2001. 
34. The northeastern portion of the disputed parcel has been washed out by the river. 
Plaintiff has attempted to reclaim this portion of property by backfilling the area. 
35. Rodney Kirk, a general contractor, testified that it would cost $4,175.00 to repair 
the alleged damage which plaintiff has caused to the disputed property. 
4
 Plaintiff testified that he was not personally served with this notice, but that he saw it for 
the first time at his former attorney's office 
36. During trial, plaintiff presented various witnesses who testified that it was the 
general understanding of those in the area that the disputed parcel was owned and occupied by 
plaintiff and his predecessors. Those witnesses were Joy Christmas (a neighbor), Dan Poulsen (a 
neighbor), Daniel Poulsen (a neighbor), Bill Argyle, Olive Clayson (plaintiffs aunt), Sterling H. 
Argyle (plaintiffs uncle), and Lois Argyle (plaintiffs mother). 
DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff asks the Court to quiet title in his favor under the legal theory of boundary by 
acquiescence, Alternatively, plaintiff asks the Court to grant him a prescriptive easement to the 
disputed area.5 
In their counterclaim, defendants request that the Court find that plaintiff is guilty of 
unlawful detainer and waste on the disputed property and pray for damages relating to those 
claims. 
Before beginning its analysis, the Court notes that plaintiff has the burden of establishing 
his claims by clear and convincing evidence. Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 
1990). Any findings of fact or conclusions of law made by this Court have been reached applying 
this evidentiary standard. 
/. Boundary by Acquiescence 
In order to establish boundary by acquiescence, plaintiff must prove the following 
elements. (1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (2) 
5
 All other claims were resolved after the Court's ruling on defendants' motion for 
summary judgment 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary i ; ; ^;c upatioii foi a lonu, pei iod offline (at IIMSI 
twenty years); and (4) by adjoining landowners u<; Hnlden, 2002 UT 33, ][ 16, 44 P.3d 781, 
788 (I Itah 2002)., Pi ior tc tl: le pi esei ltatioi I oi evidence, it le pai ties stipi Uate d tl: lat elei iieiit 3 
(occupation for a long period of time), and element 4 (by adjoining landowners), had been 
established " ' I hei efore, the only issues befoi e the Court are (1) whether plaintiff occupied the 
disputed area up to a visible line marked fa)/ mom iments fences oi hiikiings anil ( ?) vvhef (in flic 
parties mutually acquiesced to the boundaries. 
A. Occupation I Tp 1 b A I Isible I m ; " 
The undisputed testimony from all of the relevant witnesses at trial was that plaintiff and 
his predecessoi s in interest occupied the disputed property which has been described above Each 
side of the disputed property was denial culiul hyalhn .» fnia1, owl PI rmluinl slim Inn1 In 
Orton v. Cartel , 970 V 2d 12S4 (Utah 1^8), the com I: stated, "Nowhere has this Court stated 
Co., 511 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 1 Q^y> Therefore, this Court finds that plaintiff and his 
predecessors in interest occur.- •: v. disputed property]ip to a visible line. The visible line begins 
at the northwestern corner of the piopeify and follows tlio in.nl \\\\W\ the wrsfnn fciini in 111" 
south, where it is met by the wooden fence which runs to the east and connects to the eastern 
fc
" In their closing arguments, defendants asserted that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate 
elements 2, 3, and 4 of their boundary by acquiescence claim; however, prior to presenting 
evidence, the parties stipulated that elements 3 and 4 had been established (subject to the Court's 
determination of whether the long period of occupation was subject to a grant of permission by 
defendant Sterling Jones). Accordingly, the Court will only address the elements 1 and 2 in its 
analysis. 
fence, which runs north to the edge of the river, then along the edge of the river until reaching 
plaintiffs northern property. 
Defendants argue that their son-in-law's maintenance of the artesian well and any other 
minimal contact he or his wife, Marilyn Jones Argyle, had with the property is sufficient to negate 
plaintiffs claim of occupation. The Court is not persuaded by this legal argument. Additionally, 
the facts presented at trial establish that Sterling Argyle's contact with the actual disputed 
property was limited to maintaining the artesian well and that defendants themselves had no 
contact with the property. There was little credible evidence presented which would establish that 
defendants and their family used or occupied the disputed property. 
Because the Court has found that plaintiff and his predecessors in interest occupied the 
disputed property up to a visible line marked by monument, fences or buildings, the Court finds 
that plaintiff has established the first element of his boundary by acquiescence claim. 
B. Mutual Acquiescence 
To establish mutual acquiescence, plaintiff must prove that he, his predecessors in 
interest, and defendants "recognize and treat an observable line, such as a fence, as the boundary 
dividing the [defendants'] property from the [plaintiffs] property, regardless of whether the 
[parties] know where the actual boundary lies or whether the boundary is uncertain." Ault 2002 
UT at If 19, 44 P.3d at 788. Therefore, plaintiff must establish that there was mutual acquiescence 
on the part of defendant Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle or element (3) of plaintiff s boundary 
by acquiescence claim fails. 
Defendants contend that sometime after 1961 defendant Sterling Jones informed 
Charles Argyle that Jones was the record owner of the property and granted Charles Argyle 
permission to use the property until Jones or his family needed it. Defendants assert that this 
conversation establishes that both parties did not mutually acquiesce in the boundary line and, 
therefore, plaintiffs cause of action must fail 
The Court is not convinced that defendant Sterling Jones granted Charles Argyle 
permission to use the disputed property for the following reasons. First, defendant Sterling Jones 
testified that he told his son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, that he was the record owner of the disputed 
property "five or six years ago" or about the same time that Roger Argyle moved onto the 
property. In contrast, during his testimony, Sterling Argyle testified that defendant Sterling Jones 
had told him in 1962 or 1963 that he was the record owner of the disputed property, and that 
Charles Argyle was merely using the property until defendants were in need of it. Second, the 
testimony of Daniel Poulsen established that as late as April 2000, during the fire, Sterling Argyle 
stated that the disputed property belonged to plaintiff. Third, defendant Dorothy Jones testified 
that her husband told her about the permissive use sometime in 1962 or 1963. During her 
testimony, she repeatedly stated "I don't know" or "I don't remember." It was obvious to the 
Court that defendant Dorothy Jones did not have a clear recollection (if any) of the alleged 
conversation with her husband. Fourth, Marilyn Jones Argyle, the defendants' daughter, testified 
that she had always (since her childhood) believed the property belonged to her father and her 
grandfather before that. This testimony is inconsistent even with defendant Sterling Jones's 
testimony that prior to 1957 he believed that Charles Argyle owned the property. Finally, the 
Court finds it suspicious that, after the death of Charles Argyle, defendants failed to inform any of 
Charles Argyle's children or grandchildren that the property belonged to the defendants. In sum, 
the Court finds that the testimony presented by defendants to establish that defendant Sterling 
Jones granted Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed property in the early 1960s was 
contrived and unconvincing.7 
Defendants contend that no mutual acquiescence occurred because after 1961 defendant 
Sterling Jones was aware of the actual boundary line. The Court finds this argument 
unconvincing and defendants' reliance on certain case law misplaced. In Nunley v. Walker, 369 
P.2d 117, 122 (Utah 1962) the Court stated, "[I]f there is no uncertainty as to the location of the 
true boundary line the parties may not, knowing where the true boundary line is, establish a 
boundary line by acquiescence at another place." The holding in Nunley is based upon fact which 
are the opposite of the facts of this case. The facts presented at trial establish that in 
approximately 1957 there was a dispute between defendant Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle 
about the location of the actual boundary line between the disputed property and defendants' 
southern property. As a result of that dispute, defendant Sterling Jones erected a fence which 
established the boundary line. Charles Argyle did not object to this fence, and the parties 
continued to treat this as the property line until either 1962 or 1963 when defendant Sterling 
7
 Defendants may contend that plaintiff did not provide any evidence that the conversation 
did not occur and, as a result, plaintiff has failed to fulfill his burden of proof However, the 
Court recognizes that Charles Argyle, the only other party who could have testified about this 
conversation from personal knowledge, has passed away and, therefore, plaintiff has had to rely 
upon the conduct of the parties to establish his case. 
Jones claims he told Charles Argyle that he had purchased the property at a tax sale, and that 
Charles Argyle had permission to use the disputed property. As stated above, the inconsistencies 
in the witnesses' testimonies leaves this Court unconvinced that this alleged conversation ever 
occurred. Therefore, the Court finds that there was a dispute between defendant Sterling Jones 
and Charles Argyle in 1957 about the actual location of the boundary, and, that when defendant 
Sterling Jones erected the fence in approximately 1958, the parties were unaware where the true 
boundary was located. The conduct of the defendants, Charles Argyle, their children, and their 
grandchildren for the next 30 plus years is consistent with the Court's conclusion. 
The majority of the credible testimony presented at trial established that plaintiff and his 
predecessors in interest occupied and maintained the disputed property from 1953 until 2001. 
Defendants' contact with the parcel was minimal. Defendants' only significant contacts were 
Sterling Argyle's cursory visits to the artesian well. Even the construction of the wire mesh fence 
by Sterling Argyle sometime in 2000 or 2001 reiterated and reestablished the boundary line to 
which Charles Argyle and defendant Sterling Jones had acquiesced in approximately 1958. 
Additionally, according to the credible testimony presented at trial, defendant Sterling Jones never 
told Charles Argyle that he had purchased the disputed property at a tax sale in 1961. That 
defendants never disclosed this fact to plaintiff or his predecessors in interest bolsters the 
conclusion that Charles Argyle was never aware that defendant Sterling Jones owned the disputed 
property.8 
8The Court has pondered at great length why Sterling Jones chose to wait for 4 years after 
the death of Charles Argyle (and 40 years after the purchase of the property) to inform plaintiff 
Furthermore, it would be unjust for this Court to find that mutual acquiescence by two 
parties is destroyed when one of the parties fails to disclose that the record boundary line is 
different than the boundary line that has been established. The Nunley court expressly stated that 
"the parties" cannot relocate a boundary when "the parties" have knowledge of the true boundary. 
Id. In this matter, both parties did not have knowledge regarding the true boundary line; only 
Sterling Jones did and he failed to disclose this information to Charles Argyle. Mutual 
acquiescence cannot be destroyed when one party later learns that a boundary line is incorrect, yet 
fails to inform the other of the discrepancy. Such a finding would encourage secrecy and 
dishonesty among adjacent landowners and would usurp the purpose of boundary by 
acquiescence, which is "preventing strife and litigation and promoting stability in boundaries." 
Jacobs v. Hqfen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Defendants contend that because plaintiff received tax notices describing parcels A, Bl 
and B2, he had constructive notice that he was not the record owner of the disputed property. 
The Court cannot, however, making findings as to the issue of constructive notice. Neither 
plaintiff nor defendants presented evidence at trial which would support a finding by this Court 
that plaintiffs tax notices provided him with constructive notice. 
Accordingly, the Court makes the following findings: Charles Argyle and Sterling Jones 
that Sterling Jones was the record owner of the disputed property. There are no easy answers and 
there were no explanations were offered by Mr. Jones in his testimony, other than his claim of the 
conversation with Charles Argyle, which the Court has not found credible. The Court can only 
conclude that Mr. Jones was more comfortable in "taking on" plaintiff regarding this property 
issue than he was confronting Charles Argyle. 
had a dispute regarding the proper boundary lines between their parcels of property sometime in 
1957; that after this dispute defendant Sterling Jones erected a fence, which acted as the boundary 
between the properties until 2001 when this action was commenced, that Charles Argyle was 
never informed that defendants had purchased the land nor did defendants grant Charles Argyle 
permission to use the land; and that the understanding of plaintiff and his predecessors in interest 
was that the wooden fence, which was erected by defendant Sterling Jones in the late 1950s, 
marked the correct boundary line between the properties. 
According to these facts, the Court finds that Charles Argyle and defendant Sterling 
Jones mutually acquiesced to a boundary line in approximately 1958, which marked the boundary 
between what the parties believed were their rightful properties. To this day, this boundary 
continues to demarcate the boundary between the defendants' southern parcel and what plaintiff 
believed to be his parcel, i.e., the disputed property. Therefore, the Court finds the following: 
(1) that plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have occupied the disputed property up 
to a visible line; 
(2) that Charles Argyle and defendant Sterling Jones acquiesced in the fence as the 
boundary created by the southern fence in approximately 1958 when defendant Sterling Jones 
erected the fence; 
(3) that plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have occupied the disputed property for 
a long period of time (more than twenty years); and 
(4) that the parties have been and still are adjoining landowners 
Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has fulfilled his burden of establishing by clear and 
convincing evidence that he is entitled to the disputed property under the legal theory of boundary 
by acquiescence. The Court orders plaintiff to have the land surveyed by a land surveyor and, 
based on that survey, submit an appropriate decree establishing the boundary as the fence lines (as 
described by the Court) and quieting title in plaintiffs favor. Plaintiff is given 60 days to comply 
with this order. 
Because the Court has found that plaintiff has established his boundary by acquiescence 
claim, the Court need not address plaintiffs prescriptive easement claim.9 
Defendant *s Counterclaims 
Because the Court has found that title should be quieted in plaintiff and that plaintiff is 
the rightful owner of the disputed property, defendants' claims for unlawful detainer and waste 
9
 During closing arguments, defendants asserted that plaintiff could not maintain an action 
for boundary by acquiescence because plaintiff, in effect, was asking the Court to quiet title in his 
favor to an entire parcel of land. Defendants assert that adverse possession would be the 
appropriate legal theory to plead when asking the Court to quiet title in an entire parcel of 
property. The Court considered this argument and has reviewed many of the Utah cases that 
address adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence; the Court has been unable to find any 
precedent which would preclude the application of the legal theory of boundary by acquiescence 
are now moot.9 . ^ CA-
The Court orders plaintiff to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of lawxonsistent 
with this ruling. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this <3>day of July 2 Q Q 8 ^ ^ S ^ > 
IALAYCOCK 
h District Court Judge 
Case no. 010400893 
9
 Additionally, the Court notes that there was no agreement between defendant Sterling 
Jones and Charles Argyle regarding the use of the disputed property. Accordingly, had the Court 
found that defendants' were entitled to have title quieted in their favor, they would have failed in 
their waste argument 
16 
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Case No. 010400893 
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This matter comes before the Court on defendants' objections to the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order submitted by plaintiffs counsel and signed by the Court on August 
29, 2003. Defendants' objections were filed on August 18, 2003, which was within the prescribed 
time, and plaintiff filed a response and notice to submit on September 4, 2003. The Court hereby 
sets aside the signed order dated August 29, 2003 so that defendants' objections may be heard. 
Defendants also filed an Objection to Plaintiffs "Decree Quieting Title " stating that the Court 
should not sign the decree until the objections to the findings of fact have been decided. The 
Court has not yet signed the decree and recognizes defendants' objection as properly made. In 
order to rule upon these objections the Court has reviewed its memorandum decision, dated July 
25, 2003, as well as the above memoranda and the record of the trial held on June 24 and 27, 
2003, and now enters the following ruling 
DECISION UPON DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS 
Counsel for plaintiff was ordered to write findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order 
(collectively referred to as the "Order") consistent with the Court's July 25, 2003 memorandum 
decision. Plaintiff submitted the Order on or about August 11, 2003, at which time defendants 
had five days to submit an objection. Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-504(2) (2003) 
Defendants filed their objections on August 18, 2003, which was a timely objection due to the 
Rules' allowance for mailing time. 
Defendants' objections refer to specific paragraphs in plaintiffs Order and the Court will 
now address these objections in the same fashion. 
Objection to paragraph 6: The phrase "Defendant Sterling Jones and Sterling Argyle periodically 
maintained the well" will not be added to paragraph 6. The statement is incorrect because there 
was no testimony that Defendant Sterling Jones maintained the well, rather, his testimony was that 
"during the time that I was running it, we didn't have any much problem with it,"1 and that he did 
not have to maintain it. Also, the information that Sterling Argyle maintained the well is provided 
in paragraph 26. Paragraph 6 will remain unchanged. 
Objection to paragraph 7: The words "believed that he" will be added prior to the word 
"purchased" so that the phrase will read, "Charles Argyle, the plaintiffs grandfather, believed that 
he purchased the disputed property..." Defendants correctly point out that the testimony provided 
to the Court and the Court's memorandum decision state that legal title to the disputed area did 
not pass to Charles Argyle when he purchased a plot of land from George Foster or his wife, 
although Charles believed that he had purchased the disputed area and behaved as though he had. 
!Direct testimony of defendant Sterling Jones, June 24, 2003, 3 09.58 pm 
The testimony about subsequent transfers of the disputed area from Charles Argyle to his grantees 
indicated that they all believed that the transfers included the disputed area, but no evidence was 
provided to show that legal title actually passed. 
Objection to paragraph 10: There will be no changes made to paragraph 10. For the purposes of 
proving boundary by acquiescence it is irrelevant to whether Charles Argyle promised to check his 
property boundary with the Utah County Plats or whether he did not fulfil that promise. The 
information in paragraph 10, that a dispute arose due to the relocation of the canal, is important to 
prove boundary by acquiescence and is consistent with the Court's memorandum decision. 
Objection to paragraph 13: The words "The erection of the southern fence in 1958 by defendant 
Sterling Jones was in response to the dispute over the property boundary line55 will be removed 
and the words "Before checking the bounds of his property against the Utah County Plats, 
Defendant Sterling Jones built the southern fence in 1958" shall be added in their place. The 
entire paragraph shall read: "Before checking the bounds of his property against the Utah County 
Plats, Defendant Sterling Jones built the southern fence in 1958, and this fence line was used by 
both parties for over forty years." 
Testimony given at trial was that the fence functioned as a corral to keep in defendant 
Sterling Jones's horses. It was not clear that the fence was built in response to the boundary 
dispute and the Court's memorandum decision does not state that it was. 
Objection to paragraph 14: The sentence "After his death, the property was purchased by Richard 
Argyle, plaintiffs younger brother" will be removed and replaced with the phrase, "Richard 
Argyle, plaintiffs younger brother, purchased all of Charles Argyle's property, which he believed 
included the disputed area " See the explanation in the objection to paragraph 7 above. 
Objection to paragraph 16: The words "the disputed property in a trust" shall be removed and 
replaced with the phrase, "his real property, which he believed included the disputed area, in a 
trust..." See the explanation in the objection to paragraph 7 above. 
Objection to paragraph 17: The sentence shall be amended to read: "Plaintiffs parents quitclaimed 
their interest in the property, including their perceived interest in the disputed property, to plaintiff 
sometime after his brother's death." See the explanation in the objection to paragraph 7 above. 
Objection to paragraph 20: The paragraph shall remain unchanged. The testimony at trial was 
that Charles Argyle's use of the disputed area included recreational activities such as rolling eggs 
down the hill (testimony of Olive Clayson and Dan Poulsen) or swimming in the river (testimony 
of Sterling H. Argyle). The testimony also included statements that the disputed area had been 
used as a shooting range for the purposes of sighting rifles (testimony of Dan Poulsen). The 
Court finds that both Charles Argyle and Roger Argyle used the disputed area for a variety of 
purposes, including as a shooting range, a pasture and a recreation area. 
Objection to paragraph 26: The paragraph shall be deleted and changed to conform with the 
memorandum decision. It shall read: "Since 1953, defendants' use of the disputed area has been 
limited to maintaining portions of the southern fence and maintaining the artesian well. 
Defendants' son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, had minimal contact with the disputed area for these 
purposes and defendant Sterling Jones had little, if any, contact with the disputed area." 
Objection to paragraph 27- This paragraph shall not be moved 
Objection to paragraph 28- This paragraph shall not be moved. 
Objection to paragraph 29: The sentence shall be deleted and be changed to read: "All testimony 
regarding an alleged conversation between Charles Argyle and Sterling Jones regarding Jones' 
purchase of the disputed property at a tax sale in 1961 is contrived and unconvincing." This 
paragraph is not redundant and shall remain, with the above changes. 
Objection to paragraph 30: This paragraph is redundant and shall be deleted entirely. However, 
the Court has added the following words to the end of the sentence in paragraph 31: "because the 
conversation never occurred." 
Objection to paragraph 34: The words "self-serving, contradictory, contrived and unconvincing" 
shall be deleted from the first sentence and replaced with the words "unconvincing and sometimes 
contradictory." 
Paragraph 34(a) shall be changed as follows. The word "while" shall be added in the 
second sentence after the words "five or six years ago," and before the words "Sterling Argyle 
testified..." This paragraph accurately recites the findings in the memorandum decision and no 
other changes shall be made. 
Paragraph 34(b) shall not be changed. This paragraph is taken, almost verbatim, from the 
Court's memorandum decision. 
Paragraph 34(c) shall not be changed. This paragraph, too, is almost a verbatim copy of 
page ten of the Court's memorandum decision. 
Objection to Conclusion of Law ^ 3- Defendants object to the Court's conclusion that the parties 
have recognized the fence line as the boundary line because the Court used, as a supporting fact 
for that conclusion, the fact that defendant's son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, recently built a fence 
mirroring the 1958 fence. Defendants argue that the more recent fence served as part of the horse 
corral and because it served this second purpose, it should be excluded from the Court's 
consideration of a recognized boundary The Court finds this argument unpersuasive The fence 
may have served many purposes, but the testimony presented to the Court was that the fence 
served as a recognizable boundary between defendants5 property and plaintiffs' property and that 
the parties and several members of the community treated the fence line as the boundary. The 
objection is overruled. 
Objection to Conclusion of Law % 5: Defendants' object only to the last sentence, "As a result of 
that dispute, the fence was erected." The testimony at trial was not that the border dispute was 
the cause for the fence being built; in fact, there was no testimony received about the motivating 
cause for the 1958 fence. Defendant Sterling Jones' testimony was that he built the fence after 
the dispute occurred, before he checked his boundary line with the county plats, and in a location 
he described as "where I knew he [Charles Argyle] wouldn't complain."2 The last sentence of 
paragraph 5, quoted above, shall be deleted and replaced with the following sentence: "In 1958 
Defendant Sterling Jones built a fence between his property and the disputed area in a location 
that was accepted by both him and Charles Argyle." 
REVISED MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The memorandum decision of the Court dated July 25, 2003 is accurate and correct with 
the exception of paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Findings of Fact, which, without correction, would 
2Direct testimony of defendant Sterling Jones, June 24, 2003, 2 56pm 
mislead the reader to believe that actual legal title passed from Richard Argyle to his trust and 
from the beneficiaries of the trust to plaintiff As discussed above in the objection to paragraph 7, 
no testimony was presented to the Court concerning the status of the legal title of the disputed 
area and the testimony in court was that title to the disputed area was believed to be passed from 
Charles Argyle to his successors along with the rest of his property 
Paragraphs 21 and 22 shall be revised to reflect this distinction and a revised copy of the 
memorandum decision shall be attached to this ruling 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO DECREE QUIETING TITLE 
Defendants' only objection to plaintiffs Decree Quieting Title is that the decree should 
not be signed until the Order is final. The Court agrees and will hold plaintiffs decree until an 
amended Order is submitted, at which time the Court will sign both the amended Order and 
plaintiffs Decree Quieting Title. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants5 objections are denied in part and granted in part Counsel for plaintiff will 
amend the Order to comply with the above instructions and will resubmit it to the Court 
DATED this ^ _ day of October, 2003. 
/LU^M^A^, 
Case No 010400893 
iaudia Laycock 
District Court Judge^ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER ARGYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STERLING D. JONES, DOROTHY P. JONES 
and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RULE 52(b) MOTION TO AMEND 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 010400893 
Judge: Claudia Laycock 
COME NOW Defendants in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel of record, 
and submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of their Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings of 
Fact and Judgment. 
\ 
\ 
\ 
Page 1 of 5 
ARGUMENT 
L The Court never found that Sterling Jones' testimony concerning the construction of 
the fence and the disagreement between the parties over the fence line was untrue* 
The Court never directly addressed whether it believed that Sterling Jones and Charles 
Argyle had a disagreement about the placement of the fence line in 1957. Mr. Jones testimony at 
trial was that Mr. Argyle confronted Mr. Jones because Mr. Jones had moved his corral fence line 
northward because the canal had been moved. Mr. Argyle believed that Mr. Jones was building 
the fence on property that belonged to the Argyle family. Mr. Jones disagreed. Mr. Jones further 
testified that the parties agreed to check their boundary lines. Mr. Jones subsequently checked 
the property lines and discovered the property did not belong to the Argyle family. Even if Mr. 
Argyle did not remove the fence built by Mr. Jones, the question at issue is whether the parties 
mutual agreed in 1957 that the fence line delineated their respective property boundaries. 
Plaintiff suggests that because Defendants installed a wire fence that paralleled the 
original fence, Defendants "reconfirmed" the fence line. However, Sterling Argyle testified that 
the wire fence was installed to prevent the horses from chewing the original wood fence. 
Furthermore, on the issue of initial mutual acquiescence between Sterling Jones and Charles 
Argyle, it is irrelevant that the Court believed that Sterling Jones told firefighters in April 2000 
that the property belonged to Plaintiff. 
II. The Ault and Nunley, decisions do support a change in this Court's legal conclusions. 
Sterling Jones testified that neither he nor Charles Argyle initially knew where their 
property boundaries lay. Plaintiff argues that "there was neither an agreement nor anything else 
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in 1958, when the fence was established, or thereafter to indicate that Mr. Sterling Jones did not 
acquiesce in the boundary." [See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, p. 7]. In fact, Mr. 
Jones first encounter with Charles Argyle about the fence line concerned the disagreement of the 
parties as to where the true property line should exist. Plaintiff acknowledges "there was a 
dispute." [See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, p. 11]. However, this Court has never 
identified what actually gave rise to the "dispute" and whether the fence was installed before or 
after the dispute. 
There was an open dispute about the boundary line and the parties did not agree to 
"recognize" or accept the fence line as a boundary. Ault v. Holden, 44.P.3d 781, 789 (Utah 
2002) is directly applicable because it establishes the principle that even a "mere" conversation 
evidencing an ongoing dispute between the parties as to the property line or unwillingness by 
even one of the adjoining landowners to accept the line as a boundary negates the element of 
mutual acquiescence in the line as the property demarcation. 
If Sterling Jones' installation of the fence caused the "dispute" then the parties did not 
acquiesce in the fence as a boundary from the outset. Mr. Jones' subsequent actions indicate that 
he, at least, did not acquiesce in the fence line as an actual marker between the properties. 
Nunley v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117 (1962) becomes relevant in this case because once 
Sterling Jones discovered the true boundaries of his property, he could not, from that point 
forward, ever acquiesce in the fence line as a boundary. 
Finally, Plaintiff only briefly mentions the fact that the fence was built as an extension to 
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Mr. Jones' corral. No testimony was ever given that the parties built the fence as a demarcation 
line or in settlement of a dispute over the boundaries. Again, this establishes the fact that the 
parties did not conceptualize the fence as a marker to delineate their respective property 
boundaries. 
III. Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees or costs. 
Plaintiffs request attorney's fees and costs in their Memorandum in Opposition because 
they have had to answer Defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion. Plaintiff provides no legal support 
(whether statutory or contractual) for the requested fees and costs. Plaintiff is simply unhappy 
that Defendants have exercised their rights under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants 
are entitled under Rule 52(b) to revisit the facts and testimony offered in this case before the 
Court and to request the Court's reconsideration of those facts and testimony. Such 
reconsideration also assists in perfecting the record for appeal, if necessary. 
Defendants have raised several legal issues that were not fully developed and/or 
considered by the Court including the issue of initial mutual acquiescence, the fence as an 
extension of the corral and the lack of counter affidavit testimony for purposes of summary 
judgment. 
These issues merit sufficient consideration by the Court and are properly raised in 
Defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion. Defendants cannot be penalized for exercising their rights under 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse its decision with regard to 
the law and facts in this case and to grant judgment in favor of Defendants 
DATED this S day of January, 2004. 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, LX.C. 
JUSTIN R. ELSWICK, 
[ Attorney for Defendants 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH _ _ _ 
ROGER ARGYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
STERLING D. JONES and DOROTHY P. 
JONES, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS MOTION 
TO AMEND FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
JUDGMENT 
Date: March 8, 2004 
Case No. 010400893 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court upon defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact andJudgment\ which was fully briefed and submitted on February 9, 2004 
without a request for oral arguments. Having read the memoranda and being duly informed 
therefrom, the Court now enters the following ruling. 
FACTS 
1. On July 25, 2003 the Court issued a memorandum decision for the trial of the above-
captioned case. 
2. On August 18, 2003 defendants filed an Objection to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order, which were yet to be submitted to the Court. 
3. On September 3, 2003 the Court signed a document prepared by counsel for plaintiff 
entitled Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
4. On September 4, 2003 plaintiff filed a notice to submit for defendants' objections to 
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, 
5 On October 30, 2003 the Court issued a ruling on defendants' objections to the 
previously signed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and, further, released an 
Amended Memorandum Decision stating changes that needed to be made to the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order The amendments made by the Court were minor and did not 
alter the substance of the previous memorandum decision. 
6 On January 2, 2004 the Court signed a document prepared by counsel for plaintiff 
entitled Amended Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
7. The Court received defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and 
Judgment on January 12, which is the motion currently pending before the Court. 
DISCUSSION 
Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "Upon motion of a party made not 
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment accordingly." The present motion was made on January 
12, which was within the ten-day period after the entry of judgment on January 2, 2004. 
The substance of defendants' motion is that the Court erred in its July 25, 2003 
memorandum decision regarding the case law of boundary by acquiescence and that the Court 
should reconsider its analysis of the credibility of certain witnesses who testified for defendants. 
Defendants' arguments appear to be a rebuttal to the Court's memorandum decision and not a 
proper Rule 52 motion to amend the findings of fact. The Court finds no cause to amend the 
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order entered on January 2, 2004 and 
expects that further argument from defense counsel will be addressed to the appellate court 
Defendants also argue, in their Rule 52(b) motion, that a summary judgment motion from 
January 7, 2003 was incorrectly decided. Defendants do not, however, offer any rule of 
procedure that would allow the Court to now reconsider a ruling that was made more than a year 
ago, and the Court has found no authority on its own that would allow reconsideration. The 
three-month time limit of Rule 60(b) has long since passed; therefore, the Court finds that 
reconsideration of the previous summary judgment ruling is not properly before it 
In plaintiffs memorandum opposing defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion To Amend Findings 
of Fact and Judgment, plaintiffs requests attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $1,000.00 
incurred in responding to this motion. Plaintiff argues costs and fees are justified because 
defendants have made the same arguments that were presented and denied in the Court's 
Amended Memorandum Decision from October 2003 and because defendants have improperly 
asked for reconsideration of the summary judgment motion from January 2003. The Court agrees 
with plaintiff and awards plaintiff attorney's fees and costs. The Court orders plaintiffs attorney 
to submit an appropriate affidavit in support of the request amount, along with an order for the 
Court's signature. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and Judgment is denied. 
Plaintiff is awarded attorney's fees and costs related to its response to this motion. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served a true and exact copy of the foregoing by mail, postage 
prepaid, on the *% day of March, to the following: 
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P.O. Box 600 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Jere Reneer 
Reneer & Associates 
324 North Main 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER ARGYLE, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
Plaintiff, : OF LAW, AND ORDER 
vs. : 
STERLING D. JONES, DOROTHY P. JONES, : Civil No. 024400226 
and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Judge: Laycock 
Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly for trial on June 24, 2003 and June 27, 2003. Plaintiff Roger 
Argyle was present and represented by counsel Jere Reneer. Defendants Sterling D. Jones and 
Dorothy P. Jones were present and represented by Justin R. Elswick and Justin Heideman. The 
parties' stipulated prior to trial that all of the elements needed to establish plaintiffs claim of a 
prescriptive easement had been established except the adverse element. The parties also stipulated 
prior to the trial that the parties are adjoining landowners and that the disputed land had been 
occupied by the plaintiff for a sufficiently long period of time and that the third and fourth elements 
of boundary by acquiescence were established. The only issues remaining to establish plaintiffs claim 
of a boundary by acquiescence were occupation up to a visible line and mutual acquiescence. 
RECEIFEI 
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The Court having heard testimony, received evidence, and heard argument, being duly 
informed, makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Defendants are the record owners of the disputed property. 
2. Land owned by the plaintiff Roger Argyle and his predecessors in interest abuts the northern 
border of the disputed property. 
3. Defendants Sterling P. Jones and Dorothy P. Jones own land which abuts the southern border 
of the disputed property. 
4. Currently, there is an electric or hot-wire fence between defendants' property to the south and 
the disputed property. To the south of this electric or hot-wire fence are a wooden fence and a metal, 
mesh fence. The eastern side of the property is marked by a fence which runs north from defendants' 
southern property to the river ("eastern fence"). The western boundary of the disputed property is 
demarcated by a fence which runs north from defendants' southern property to plaintiffs northern 
property ("western fence"). Prior to the western fence being built, a road marked this boundary of the 
property. 
5. The disputed property does not constitute the entire parcel which defendants own of record. A 
small section to the east of the disputed property is not claimed by plaintiff. This area is marked as 
parcel E on defendants' exhibit #1, and the hay wagon and silage pit are located on this piece of 
property. 
6. Located within the disputed area is an artesian well, and a pipe that runs through the ground to 
the covered canal. 
7. Charles Argyle, the plaintiffs grandfather, purchased the disputed property sometime in 1953 
from George Foster or his wife. 
8. Defendant Sterling Jones believed that Charles Argyle owned the property prior to 1957. 
9. In approximately 1957, the canal company decided to develop and improve the canal system 
that abutted portions of the southern and western sides of the disputed property. 
10. Due to the relocation of the canal, a dispute arose between Charles Argyle and defendant 
Sterling Jones as to the appropriate location of the boundary line between the disputed property and 
defendants' southern property. 
11. In approximately 1958, defendant Sterling Jones installed the wooden southern fence. This 
southern fence is the wooden fence that is south of the disputed property and north of the defendants 
property. At the time of the installation of this fence, the parties were unaware of the true boundary 
line between their properties. 
12. Charles Argyle did not object to this fence and the parties continued to treat this fence as the 
property line from 1958 through the commencement of this action in 2001. 
13. The erection of the southern fence in 1958 by defendant Sterling Jones was in response to the 
dispute over the property boundary line and this fence line was used by both parties for over forty 
years. 
14. Charles Argyle died in September 1997. After his death, the property was purchased by 
Richard Argyle, plaintiffs younger brother. Richard Argyle believed that he was also purchasing the 
disputed property. 
15. In the spring of 1998, Richard Argyle built a fence along the western border of the disputed 
property (western fence). 
16. Richard Argyle died in January 1999. Richard left the disputed property in a trust, which 
named plaintiffs parents as beneficiaries. 
17. Plaintiffs parents quitclaimed the disputed property to plaintiff sometime after his brother's 
death. 
18. In either 2000 or 2001, plaintiff ran an electrical or hot-wire fence between the disputed 
property and defendants' property to the south. 
19. In either 2000 or 2001, defendants' son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, built a metal, mesh fence that 
paralleled the wooden fence on the south border of the disputed property. 
20. Since 1953, plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have used the disputed property as a 
shooting range, pasture and recreation area. They have also rented the disputed property to non-
parties for pasturing. Specifically, plaintiff and his predecessors in interest rented the disputed 
property to Joe Bybee from approximately 1991-2001. 
21. The river has washed out the northeastern portion of the disputed parcel. Plaintiff has 
attempted to reclaim this portion of the property by backfilling the area. 
22. Many people understood that the disputed property was owned and knew that the property 
was occupied by plaintiff and his predecessors in interest. These people are Joy Christmas (a 
neighbor), Dan Poulsen (a neighbor), Daniel Pouisen (a neighbor), Bill Argyle, Olive Clayson 
(plaintiffs aunt), Sterling H. Argyle (plaintiffs uncle), and Lois Argyle (plaintiffs mother). 
23. On April 8, 2000, a fire broke out on the Sorensens' property, which located east of the 
disputed property. The fire jumped the river and ignited certain portions of the disputed property. At 
the time of the fire Daniel Poulsen, who is a neighbor to the parties, witnessed a conversation 
between Sterling Argyle, defendant's son in law, and a fireman. The fireman asked who owned the 
disputed property. Sterling Argyle replied that plaintiff owned it 
24. Plaintiff rented equipment and expended time to clean up the disputed property after the fire. 
25. The plaintiff and his predecessors in interest have always occupied the disputed property up to 
a visible line. The visible line begins at the northwestern corner of the property and follows the road, 
later the western fence, to the south where it is met by the wooden fence which runs to the east and 
connects to the eastern fence. The eastern fence runs north to the edge of the river, then along the 
edge of the river until reaching plaintiffs northern property. 
26. Since 1953, defendants have made no use of the property. The defendants have maintained 
the southern fence that excluded them from the property. Only the defendants' son-in-law, Sterling 
Argyle, has had any contact with the property and this contact was cursory. 
27. Defendant Sterling Jones checked the property descriptions in 1961. At that time, he 
discovered that neither he nor Charles Argyle were the record owners of the disputed property, and 
that the disputed property was noticed for a tax sale. 
28. On May 24, 1961, without informing Charles Argyle, defendants purchased the disputed 
property at the tax sale for $7.00. 
29. All testimony regarding a conversation between Charles Argyle and Sterling Jones regarding 
the tax sale in 1961 is contrived, unconvincing, self-serving and unsupported by the evidence. 
30. The credible testimony at trial shows that defendant Sterling Jones never told Charles Argyle 
that he, Sterling Jones, had purchased the disputed property at a tax sale in 1961. 
31. The Court finds that the defendants never gave Charles Argyle permission to use the disputed 
property. 
32. Defendant Sterling Jones never told the plaintiff, his brother Richard, or their father Ron that 
defendant was the record owner of the disputed property. 
33. The understanding of Charles Argyle and his successors in interest, including plaintiff, was 
that the wooden fence erected in approximately 1958 by defendant Sterling Jones was the correct 
boundary line between the properties. 
34. The testimony of defendants and their witnesses was self-serving, contradictory, contrived 
and unconvincing. There was little agreement between the testimony of the defendants' witnesses and 
the defendants' testimony. Witnesses were excluded from the court during the trial and, therefore, did 
not know what others had testified, 
a. In particular, there was contradictory testimony as to when certain alleged 
conversations took place. Defendant Sterling Jones testified that he told his son-in-law Sterling 
Argyle about the permissive use about five or six years ago. Sterling Argyle testified that defendant 
Sterling Jones told him about the permissive use in 1962 or 1963. 
b. Defendant Dorothy Jones repeatedly testified, "I don't know" or "I don't remember" 
when questioned about a 1962 or 1963 conversation with her husband, defendant Sterling Jones, 
regarding the permissive use. It is obvious to the Court that defendant Dorothy Jones did not have a 
clear recollection (if any) of this alleged conversation regarding permissive use. 
c. The defendants' daughter testified that she had thought since childhood that the 
disputed property belonged to her father and her grandfather before that. This is contradicted by 
defendant Sterling Jones's testimony that he believed that Charles Argyle owned the property prior to 
1957. 
35. Sometime in 2000, Sterling Argyle told plaintiff that defendant Sterling Jones was the rightful 
owner of the property. Defendants did not before that time inform anyone, including the plaintiff or 
his predecessors in interest, that the property defendants claimed the disputed land even though the 
plaintiff and his predecessors in interest were making improvements on and continued to use the 
disputed property. 
36. On March 21, 2000, defendants served plaintiff with a Notice to Quit Premises. The notice to 
quit referenced the disputed property by property description. It is unclear whether plaintiff was 
actually personally served with this notice. 
37. Plaintiff has not vacated (and continues to occupy) the disputed property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff has proven all of the elements of a boundary by acquiescence by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
2. As to the first element of boundary by acquiescence, plaintiff and his predecessors in interest 
have occupied the property up to a visible line and any contacts by defendants with the disputed 
property, including the defendants' son-in-law's cursory contact with the property, are insufficient to 
negate the plaintiffs claim of occupation. 
3. As to the second element of boundary by acquiescence, acquiescence, the plaintiff has proven 
by clear and convincing evidence that the parties have "recognize[d] and treat[ed] an observable line . 
. . as the boundary dividing the [defendants'] property from the [plaintiffs] property. Ault v. Holden, 
2002 UT 33,1f 19, 44 P.3d 781, 788 (Utah 2002). The fact that Charles Argyle was never informed of 
the tax sale purchase, the fact that the most recent fence built by defendant's son-in-law mirrors the 
1958 fence built by defendant, and that the defendants never told any of Charles Argyle's relatives 
after Charles' death that the land use was permissive bolsters the conclusion that the boundary was 
acquiesced in. 
4. Mutual acquiescence was not destroyed because one party knew the true boundary line of the 
properties. The Court cannot reach the conclusion that mutual acquiescence is destroyed if one party 
has knowledge of the true boundary because it would be contrary to and usurp the purposes of a 
boundary by acquiescence, namely "preventing strife and litigation and promoting stability in 
boundaries." Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)(internal citations and quotation 
omitted). Any application of boundary by acquiescence should promote openness and honesty among 
adjacent landowners, not secrecy and dishonesty. Defendant Sterling Jones failed to disclose that the 
record boundary line was different than the boundary line that was established in approximately 1958 
by the fence that he himself erected. He cannot now claim that there was no acquiescence merely 
because he knew the correct boundary. 
5. The case Nunley v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117 (Utah 1962), does not apply to this situation. The 
facts of this case are the opposite of the Nunley decision. In this case, unlike Nunley, plaintiff and 
his predecessors in interest were unaware of the true boundary and there was a boundary dispute in 
approximately 1958 between plaintiffs predecessor in interest and the defendant. As a result of that 
dispute, the fence was erected. 
6. The parties stipulated that the occupation of the land had been for a sufficiently long period of 
time and that the parties were adjoining landowners, the third and fourth elements of a boundary by 
acquiescence. 
7. Since the plaintiff has prevailed on his boundary by acquiescence claim, the Court does not 
need to address the plaintiffs prescriptive easement claim. 
8. Because the Court has found that title should be quieted in the plaintiff, the defendants' 
claims for unlawful detainer and waste are moot. 
9. Plaintiff, having proven a boundary by acquiescence is entitled to a decree quieting title to the 
disputed land. 
ORDER 
1. The plaintiff shall within sixty (60) days at the date of this order, have the disputed 
land surveyed by a land surveyor and, based on that survey, submit an appropriate decree establishing 
the boundary of the disputed land as the fence lines (as described in the Court's Findings of Fact) and 
quieting title in plaintiff. 
DATED this day of 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
N O T I C E 
The foregoing ORDER has been submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule 4-
504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, allows five (5) days for opposing counsel, or opposing 
parties, to submit notice of objection to the Order. If such objection as to form is not received within 
the prescribed time period, the ORDER will be executed by the Court. 
Dated this 11th day of August, 2003. 
REISER & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, on the / / of (AWfjI^r 2003, to the 
following: 
Justin R. Elswick 
-Justin Heideman 
2696 North University Ave, Suite 180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, UT 84604 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER ARGYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STERLING D. JONES, DOROTHY P. JONES 
and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS TO 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER 
Case No. 010400893 
Judge: Claudia Laycock 
COME NOW Defendants in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel of record, and 
submit this objection to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order as prepared and submitted 
by plaintiff. Defendants object to those findings and conclusions that are unsubstantiated by the Court in 
its Memorandum Decision or where those findings and conclusions contradict facts accepted by the 
Court or assume facts not accepted into evidence by the Court. Defendants have attempted to cite the 
Court's own Memorandum Decision in order to validate their objections. 
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OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT 
Defendants object to the following enumerated paragraphs in the Findings of Facts 
section: 
Paragraph 6: Defendants request that the following language be added to this paragraph: 
"Sterling Jones and Sterling Argyle periodically maintained the well." [See Memorandum 
Decision, pg. 3, ^  8; pg. 6, f 32]. 
Paragraph 7: Plaintiffs grandfather never "purchased" the disputed property sometime in 1953 
from George Foster or his wife. This Court only found that "Plaintiff and various other witnesses 
testified that Charles Argyle, plaintiffs grandfather, purchased the disputed property sometime in 
1953 from George Foster or his wife." [See Memorandum Decision, pg. 3, f 9]. The legal 
description of the actual deed transferred by Christena Jane Foster (George Foster's wife) to 
Charles Argyle describes a parcel of property north-east of the disputed property that is entirely 
unrelated to the disputed property and does not share the same legal description as the disputed 
property. It has already been established that Charles Argyle never held actual title to the 
disputed property, but only believed that his purchase of the Foster property included the 
disputed property as well. Documentary evidence makes this point clear, and Plaintiff presented 
no evidence at trial that establishes that Charles Argyle ever purchased the disputed property or 
held title to the disputed property. 
Paragraph 10: This paragraph should include language to the effect that the Sterling Jones and 
Charles Argyle decided to check their property descriptions because they agreed that they were 
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uncertain as to where the southern boundary line should be, but that thereafter, Charles Argyle 
never acted to resolve the dispute. [See Memorandum Decision, pg. 4, ff 12-13]. 
Paragraph 13: The erection of the southern fence in 1958 by Sterling Jones was not "in 
response" to the dispute over the property boundary line. The canal company granted a strip of 
property running east-to-west on the north side of the Sterling Jones' property in exchange for a 
strip running north-to-south on the west side of Sterling Jones' property. This allowed the canal 
company to eliminate the zigzag of the canal line and run it directly north-to-south along the west 
side of the property and parallel to the road. After receiving this strip on the north side of his 
property from the canal company, Sterling Jones decided to extend his fence line northwards. To 
that end, he began building a new fence running east-to-west on the new northern strip. It was at 
that point that Charles Argyle approached Sterling Jones. Charles Argyle was concerned that 
Sterling Jones' new fence was pushing into property that he believed was his. It was at that point 
that the parties agreed to check their fence lines. Sterling Jones completed the new fence shortly 
thereafter. The dispute arose because Sterling Jones was building a new fence on his newly 
acquired north strip. In other words, the fence was the cause of the dispute—the dispute did not 
prompt Sterling Jones to construct the fence. That fence is presently the fence that divides the 
southern part of the disputed property from Sterling Jones' property. Sterling Jones clearly 
testified that Charles Argyle approached him because Mr. Jones was building a fence and that the 
dispute occurred for that reason. 
Paragraph 14: The sentence "After his death, the property was purchased by Richard Argyle, 
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plaintiffs younger brother" is ambiguous. The only property ever purchased or conveyed by 
Charles Argyle and his successors were two properties located north-west and north-east of the 
actual disputed property. These two properties have entirely separate legal descriptions from the 
disputed parcel as was evidenced by the plat images presented to the Court at trial. Although it 
may be correct to state that Richard Argyle believed he was purchasing the disputed property, the 
reality is that Richard Argyle's purchases did not include the disputed property. This Court has 
found that Sterling Jones was the record title owner when he purchased the disputed property in 
1961. Plaintiff never presented any documentary evidence that proves that the disputed property 
was included in a purchase or conveyance document to Richard Argyle. In fact, as stated 
previously, Charles Argyle's purchased a piece of property north-east of the disputed parcel from 
Christena Jane Foster. Charles Argyle and his successors all believed that this purchase included 
the disputed property, but it did not. This mistaken belief was perpetuated and although none of 
the plaintiffs property documents contain a description of the disputed property, plaintiff and his 
predecessors just assumed that the description of the north-east parcel included the disputed 
property. 
Paragraph 16: Richard Argyle never left the disputed property in a trust that named plaintiffs 
parents as beneficiaries. Again, it would be impossible for Richard Argyle to "leave" the 
disputed property in a trust when there is absolutely no evidence of a conveyance containing a 
legal description of the disputed property. Richard Argyle allegedly transferred the two 
properties north of the disputed property into a trust. However, those two properties have 
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completely different legal descriptions than the disputed property. Despite this obvious fact, 
plaintiff insists on claiming that the disputed property was "purchased," "conveyed," or 
"quitclaimed" by him or his successors. These claims all relate back to the mistaken belief that 
the north-east property purchased by Charles Argyle from Christena Jane Foster included the 
disputed property. A simple look at the property descriptions and their locations verifies that this 
is not the case. Any transfers of the Foster property by Christena Jane Foster to Charles Argyle 
and from Charles Argyle to his successors contain only the legal description of the north-east 
parcel The disputed parcel has a separate legal description and is not to be found in the 
plaintiffs chain of title. Defendants respectfully request that the Court take notice of this legal 
and factual reality and correct the findings in its own Memorandum Decision at page 5, 
paragraphs 21-22. 
Paragraph 17: For the reasons set forth in the preceding paragraph, Defendants object to the 
statement that "[p]laintiff s parents quitclaimed the disputed property to plaintiff sometime after 
his brother's death." Charles Argyle and his predecessors were unaware of the legal description 
of the disputed property and never included its description in any conveyance document. The 
only properties transferred where the two properties situated to the north-west and north-east of 
the disputed property. This Court accepted the chain of title evidence that established that 
Defendants have held title to the disputed property since 1961, and that neither Charles Argyle 
nor his successors ever held record title to the disputed property. 
Paragraph 20: Defendants request that this paragraph include a clarification. This entire lawsuit 
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was commenced after Defendants served plaintiff with a Notice to Quit. As indicated in 
plaintiff was destroying the property by using it as a shooting range and as a place to ride motor 
vehicles on. Whnc .1 . > .mJispiiuAi liui plaiuuM was using the property as a shooting range and 
"recreational" area, no testimony was ever taken ai trial that Charles Argyle or Richard Argyle 
used it for those purposes. In fact, Sterling Jones indicated in his testimony that the disputed 
specify that plaintiffs predecessors used the disputed property as a pasture, but that more 
recently, plaintiff has used the disputed property as a shooting range and recreational area,. 
Paragraph. 26: It is incorrect to state that defendants have made no use of the property since 
1953. The Court notes that since 1953, "defendant 's use of the property has been limited to 
maintaining portions of the son ithei 11. fence and maintaining the a rtesian "w rell " [See 
Memorandum Decision, pg. 6, f^ 32]. 
I ill in i;, 1 ajiLUL/• h( ni' purposes of continuity, defendants request that this paragraph appear after 
paragraph 13 in the Order. 
graph 28: For purposes of continuity, defendants request that this paragraph, appear after 
I,., >h 13 in the Order. 
^qp l i 29:• Paragraph 29 and. paragraph. 30 are redundant, Furthermore, the language used in 
paragraph. Jv is, in defendants' estimation, inappropriate foi a judicial, order. It .is sufficient to 
state "1:1: lat the C01 11: t believed the test imoi i,.y t o b e coin..! .1 i/v e d < :>i lacking in credibili! ; '. 
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Paragraph 34: As with paragraph 29, defendants request that the order contain a more 
appropriate statement of the Court's opinion as to the defendants and witnesses testimonies. 
Furthermore, the statement that "there was little agreement between the testimony of defendants' 
witnesses and defendants' testimony" is somewhat general and overbroad. The Court found a 
few specific instances of alleged contradiction in the testimonies of defendants' and their 
witnesses. 
OBJECTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Defendants object to the following enumerated paragraphs in the Conclusions of Law 
section: 
Paragraph 3: Defendants object to the phrase "the fact that the most recent fence built by 
defendant's son-in-law mirrors the 1958 fence built by defendant. . . . " because of the implication 
that arises from this phrasing. As was clearly explained by defendants' witnesses at trial, the 
fence built by Sterling Jones in 1958 was dilapidated. This was partially due to the fact that 
plaintiff had allowed neighbors' horses to chew the fence. In order to ensure that their own 
horses were not chewing the fence, defendants' son-in-law Sterling Argyle, placed a metal fence 
several inches south of the old fence. The old fence, was part of the horse corral that contained 
defendants' horses. Sterling Argyle also testified that on occasion, he would make repairs on the 
1958 fence. Again, because the 1958 fence functioned as part of the corral, it is reasonable that 
repairs would be made so that the defendants' horses would not escape. Defendants object to any 
inference that the maintenance of the old fence or the installation of the metal fence proves that 
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defendants recognized the old fence as a boundary line. In addition, Sterling Argyle did inform 
plaintiff in 2000 or 2001 that Sterling Jones was the rightful owner of the disputed property. [See 
Memorandum Decision, pg. 6, f 28]. 
Paragraph 5: Defendants object to the last sentence in the paragraph. The fence was not erected 
as a result of the dispute between Charles Argyle and Sterling Jones. Sterling Jones was 
approached by Charles Argyle because a fence was being constructed. The construction of the 
fence in 1958 led to the dispute, not vice-versa. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _[£_ day of August, 2003. 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, LX.C. 
ey for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this day of August, 2003, a true and 
accurate copy of the foregoing OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW and ORDER was delivered to the following: 
Jere Reneer 
RENEER & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
324 North Main 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660-0298 
Service made by: 
X First Class US Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile 
Hand delivery 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L. L. C. 
Shauntel Hart 
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Jere Reneer (7967) 
Lee Fisher (8925) 
RENEER & ASSOCIATES 
324 North Main 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Telephone (801) 798-3574 
Facsimile (801) 798-3576 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER ARGYLE, : MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' RULE 52(b) MOTION 
Plaintiff, : AMEND FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
STERLING D. JONES, DOROTHY P. JONES, : Civil No. 010400893 
and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Judge: Laycock 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW, ROGER ARGYLE, plaintiff, by and through counsel and submits the 
following memorandum in opposition to the defendants' Rule 52(b) motion to amend findings and 
judgment. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
1. "Due to the relocation of the canal, a dispute arose between Charles Argyle and 
defendant Sterling Jones as to the appropriate location of the boundary line between the disputed 
property and defendants' southern boundary. Defendant Sterling Jones testified that the parties 
decided to check the property descriptions and then resolve the dispute." July 25, 2003, 
Memorandum Decision, p. 4, J^ 12. The Defendants paraphrased this in paragraph 3 of their statement 
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of undisputed facts as "As a result [sic] this argument, Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle agreed that 
they would check their property descriptions in order to ascertain their true property boundary lines." 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of their Rule 52(b) Motion, p. 2. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
2. "In approximately 1958, defendant Sterling Jones installed the wooden southern fence. 
This southern fence is the wooden fence that is south of the disputed property and north of the 
defendants property. At the time of the installation of this fence, the parties were unaware of the true 
boundary line between their properties." Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
(Findings of Fact |^ 11). 
3. "Charles Argyle did not object to this fence and the parties continued to treat this 
fence as the property line from 1958 through the commencement of this action in 2001," Amended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (Findings of Fact |^ 12). 
4. "Before checking the bounds of his property against the Utah County Plats, Defendant 
Sterling Jones built the southern fence in 1958, and this fence line was used by both parties for over 
forty years." Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (Findings of Fact ^ 13). 
5. "In either 2000 or 2001, plaintiff ran an electrical or hot-wire fence between the 
disputed property and defendants' property to the south." Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order (Findings of Fact |^ 18). 
6. "In either 2000 or 2001, defendants' son-in-law, Sterling Argyle, built a metal, mesh 
fence that paralleled the wooden fence on the south border of the disputed property." Amended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (Findings of Fact j^ 19). 
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7. "On April 8, 2000, a fire broke out on the Sorensens' property, which located east of 
the disputed property. The fire jumped the river and ignited certain portions of the disputed property. 
At the time of the fire Daniel Poulsen, who is a neighbor to the parties, witnessed a conversation 
between Sterling Argyle, defendant's son in law, and a fireman. The fireman asked who owned the 
disputed property. Sterling Argyle replied that plaintiff owned it." Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order (Findings of Fact ^ 23). 
8. "All testimony regarding a conversation between Charles Argyle and Sterling Jones 
regarding Jones' purchase of the disputed property at a tax sale in 1961 is contrived and 
unconvincing." Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (Findings of Fact ^ 29). 
9. 'The Court finds that the defendants never gave Charles Argyle permission to use the 
disputed property because the conversation never occurred." Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order (Findings of Fact ^ 30). 
10. "Defendant Sterling Jones never told the plaintiff, his brother Richard, or their father 
Ron that defendant was the record owner of the disputed property." Amended Findings of Fact, . 
Conclusions of Law, and Order (Findings of Fact ^ 31). 
11. 'The understanding of Charles Argyle and his successors in interest, including 
plaintiff, was that the wooden fence erected in approximately 1958 by defendant Sterling Jones was 
the correct boundary line between the properties." Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order (Findings of Fact ^ 32). 
12. "The testimony of defendants and their witnesses was unconvincing and sometimes 
contradictory. There was little agreement between the testimony of the defendants' witnesses and the 
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defendants' testimony. Witnesses were excluded from the court during the trial and, therefore, did not 
know what others had testified. 
a. In particular, there was contradictory testimony as to when certain alleged 
conversations took place. Defendant Sterling Jones testified that he told his son-in-law Sterling 
Argyle about the permissive use about five or six years ago while Sterling Argyle testified that 
defendant Sterling Jones told him about the permissive use in 1962 or 1963. 
b. Defendant Dorothy Jones repeatedly testified, "I don't know" or "I don't remember" 
when questioned about a 1962 or 1963 conversation with her husband, defendant Sterling Jones, 
regarding the permissive use. It is obvious to the Court that defendant Dorothy Jones did not have a 
clear recollection (if any) of this alleged conversation regarding permissive use. 
c. The defendants' daughter testified that she had thought since childhood that the 
disputed property belonged to her father and her grandfather before that. This is contradicted by 
defendant Sterling Jones's testimony that he believed that Charles Argyle owned the property prior to 
1957." 
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (Findings of Fact |^ 33). 
13. "Sometime in 2000, Sterling Argyle told plaintiff that defendant Sterling Jones was 
the rightful owner of the property. Defendants did not before that time inform anyone, including the 
plaintiff or his predecessors in interest, that the property defendants claimed the disputed land even 
though the plaintiff and his predecessors in interest were making improvements on and continued to 
use the disputed property." Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (Findings of 
Fact U 34). 
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STATEMENT OF LAW 
Utah Rule 52(b) states in relevant part that "[u]pon motion of a party made not later than 10 
days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may 
amend the judgment accordingly." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b). 
Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding judgments and costs states in relevant 
part: "(b)-.-In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, 
however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or 
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that, "When summary judgment has been granted on some 
issues, but a final judgment in the case had not been entered, the summary judgment was subject 
to revision "under subdivision (b)": A motion to reconsider was a reasonable means of requesting 
such revision and was therefore permitted." Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) 
(emphasis added). 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANTS HAVE MISSTATED THE FINDING OF FACT THAT STERLING JONES 
AND CHARLES ARGYLE AGREED THAT THEY WOULD CHECK THEIR PROPERTY 
DESCRIPTIONS. 
The Defendants' statement of undisputed facts, as shown by the comparison in paragraph 1 of 
the statement of disputed facts in this memorandum, incorrectly paraphrases a paragraph of the 
Court's July 25, 2003, Memorandum Decision. The Court only found that Sterling Jones testified that 
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there was a conversation between himself and Charles Argyle to check the property descriptions, not 
that such a conversation actually took place. In fact, Mr. Sterling's testimony on the matter was ruled 
"contrived and unconvincing," and irrelevant. See Ruling on Defendants' Objection to Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and on Defendants' Objection to Decree Quieting Title, p. 3. 
The Court even specifically commented that while this agreement allegedly was made in 
1957, Mr. Sterling, "for reasons which were not explained at trial," "did not check the property 
descriptions until 1961." July 25, 2003, Memorandum Decision, p. 4, ^ 14. The importance of 
whether an agreement was found to exist is discussed below. 
L THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT MUTUAL ACQUIESCENCE AROSE IN THIS 
MATTER. 
There was no finding that Charles Argyle agreed to check and see where the actual boundary 
was located. Acquiescence arose when the fence line was established and the parties treated it 
as the boundary. 
The Court never found that an agreement existed between Charles Argyle and Sterling Jones 
to check the plats and ascertain where the true boundary was. In fact, the Court ruled that it was 
irrelevant whether such an agreement was made and refused to find such an agreement had been 
made. See Ruling on Defendants' Objection to Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and 
on Defendants' Objection to Decree Quieting Title, p. 3. 
Since the Court did not find that there was an agreement in 1957 to check where the actual 
boundary was located, acquiescence arose when the fence line was established and the parties treated 
the fence line as the boundary between the properties for the next several decades. This acquiescence 
included the building of additional fences by both parties along this original fence line and Sterling 
Argyle's statement to firefighters in April 2000 that the property belonged to plaintiff. See Statement 
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of Undisputed Facts, above. It is interesting to note that nowhere in their motion and memorandum 
do Defendants dispute these actual findings of fact. 
The remainder of the testimony presented at trial shows that the parties used the fence as a 
boundary, repaired the fence, and established new fences along the same line. Thus, with no finding 
that there was an agreement or that a conversation occurred, the Court properly found mutual 
acquiescence. 
The cases cited by Defendants do not support amending the Court's Findings and Judgment 
and the Court has already found the Defendants' reliance on one of these cases to be 
"misplaced." 
The portions of the Ault v. Holden case cited by defendants do not apply to this matter. In 
Ault one party was unwilling to accept a boundary line and manifested that disagreement through 
several conversations that the Court had found actually occurred. A closer examination of the Ault 
decision shows that it actually supports the Court's ruling in this matter. The Ault court recognized 
that an owner "must only take some action manifesting that they do not acquiesce or recognize the 
particular line, e.g., a fence, as a boundary between the properties." Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781, 789 
(Utah 2002). 
Unlike the parties in Ault, there was neither an agreement nor anything else in 1958, when the 
fence was established, or thereafter to indicate that Mr. Sterling Jones did not acquiesce in the 
boundary. The Court has specifically found that the alleged conversation giving Charles Argyle 
permission to use the land did not occur. 
The Court held that Sterling Jones' knowledge of the true boundary in 1961 did not destroy 
the acquiescence and that there was no credible evidence that Charles Argyle was ever informed of 
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the true boundary or the purchase of the property by Sterling Jones at a tax sale. Amended 
Memorandum Decision of October 30, 2003, pp. 11-13. In fact, the Defendants admit in their 
memorandum that Sterling Jones never told "Plaintiff or Richard Argyle . . . that Defendants claimed 
the disputed land." Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Rule 52(b) 
Motion, p. 11. The remaining testimony, as set forth above, shows that the parties recognized the 
boundary line for decades after the fence was built. The Court properly found acquiescence. 
The case of Nunley v. Walker is also inapplicable to this situation as the Court has previously 
noted twice before, in its Memorandum Decision and Amended Memorandum Decision. In Nunley, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that if there is no uncertainty as to the boundary then there can be no 
acquiescence to establish a boundary line at another place. Nunley v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117, 122 
(1962). However, at the time the boundary in this matter was established, there was uncertainty as to 
the boundary. "But if the parties do not know where the actual boundary line is, even though they 
could have readily ascertained that fact by a survey, a boundary line by acquiescence may be 
established." Id. As shown by these quotes, the analysis contemplated by Nunley focuses on the time 
the acquiescence occurred and does not examine whether a party had knowledge of the true boundary 
at any time after the acquiescence. 
The Court found that the boundary was acquiesced to in 1957 when the fence was erected and 
that there was dispute at that time as to the actual location of the boundary. Sterling Jones' research 
on the true boundary in 1961 did not destroy his prior acquiescence to the boundary at a time when it 
was unknown. The Court has held that Sterling Jones' knowledge of the true boundary in 1961 did 
not destroy the acquiescence and that there was no credible evidence that Charles Argyle was ever 
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informed of the true boundary or the purchase of the property by Sterling Jones at a tax sale and 
therefore Defendants reliance on Nunley was "misplaced." Amended Memorandum Decision of 
October 30, 2003, pp. 11-13. In any event, the Defendants admit in their memorandum that Sterling 
Jones never told "Plaintiff or Richard Argyle . . . that Defendants claimed the disputed land," 
anyway, defeating their argument thereby. Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Rule 52(b) Motion, p. 11. 
The result in the case of Wright v. Clissold, 521 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1974) sighted by 
Defendants, is also distinguishable on its facts. In that case, the fence had been built on the person's 
own land and the neighbor was told by the landowner that such fence was not the boundary line. Id. 
at 1227. The case of Ringwood v. Bradford was also based on an owner who built a fence on his own 
land when there was no conflict as to the boundary and there were boundary stakes still in the ground 
showing the actual boundary between the parties. Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P.2d 1053, 1054-1055 
(Utah 1954). 
Finally, there is no issue of sharing property in this matter. There was no testimony that the 
land was shared. In fact, the Court explicitly found that there was never a conversation where Sterling 
Jones gave permission to Charles Argyle to use the land. As stated in the case of Brown v. Milliner, 
232 P,2d 202, 207 (Utah 1951), 
"[w]e have further held in this state that in the absence of evidence that the owners of 
adjoining property or their predecessors in interest ever expressly agreed as to the 
location of the boundary between them, if they have occupied their respective premises 
up to an open boundary line visibly marked by monuments, fences or buildings for a long 
period of time and mutually recognized it as the dividing line between them, the law will 
imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can do so consistently with the 
facts appearing, and will not permit the parties nor their grantees to depart from such 
line." 
1
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This is what occurred here. The Court acted properly and the motion should be denied. 
It is irrelevant whether the fence was originally established to extend a corral or to establish a 
boundary, the parties' subsequent conduct proved mutual acquiescence, 
A fence established for another purpose can serve as the boundary in a boundary by 
acquiescence case. These cases support the same principles that the Court has already used to 
establish a boundary by acquiescence. The case of Holmes v. Judge, 87 P. 1009 (Utah 1906), cited by 
Defendants, states that 
the interests of society . . . demand that there shall be stability in boundaries, and that, 
where parties have for a long term of years acquiesced in a certain line between their own 
and their neighbors' property, they will not thereafter be permitted to say that what they 
permitted to appear as being established by and with their consent and agreement was in 
fact false. 
Id. at 1014. 
[E]ach case must be determined by its own peculiar facts and circumstances, still where, 
as in this case, the facts respecting the acquiescence for so many years, and the open and 
visible boundary is so clearly established, and the knowledge thereof by interested parties 
is so clearly shown, the general principles recognized by all authorities apply with full 
force, and we cannot do otherwise than to give them effect. 
Id. Accord. Glenn v. Whitney, 209 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1949). 
Wright v. Clissold discusses the issue presented by Defendants in this way. 
Once [the elements of a boundary by acquiescence] are established, the court is required 
to presume the existence of a binding agreement unless the party who assails it proves by 
competent evidence that there actually was no agreement between the adjoining 
landowners or there could not have been a proper agreement. Facts which prove the latter 
include the following: (1) no parties available to make an agreement, e.g., sole ownership 
of the property with the existing line which was later transferred in tracts to two or more 
other persons; (2) the line was set for a purpose other than setting a boundary; (3) the 
absence of a dispute or uncertainty in fixing the boundary, and (4) possibly mistake or 
inadvertence in locating the boundary on facts that would warrant relief in equity." 
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Wright, 521 P.2d at 1226. See also, Ringwood, 269 P.2d at 1055-56 (discussing same 
principles). 
The Court is not required to hold that there was no boundary by acquiescence because the 
fence was built for another purpose because the Defendants have not rebutted the presumption of an 
agreement. The facts of this case overwhelmingly show that there was a dispute, the parties treated 
the fence as the boundary for decades without Sterling Jones saying anything about the fence not 
being the true boundary, Sterling Jones' testimony was not credible at trial, and the community, 
including Defendants' own relatives, believed the fence to be the boundary. The motion to amend 
should be denied. 
Whether or not the fence line acted as a horse corral is irrelevant to the finding of 
acquiescence. The facts of the matter are that a fence line was established after a dispute between 
Sterling Jones and Charles Argyle, the parties have treated that fence line as the boundary for 
decades, including making statements to the effect to third parties, by erecting new fences along the 
same line, and Sterling Jones never informed Charles Argyle he disputed the boundary. Whether the 
fence line was to establish a boundary that also formed part of a corral fence is not relevant. 
Defendants have failed to submit proof to refute that all parties treated the fence as the boundary. 
Apparently Defendants hope that by merely repeating over and over arguments that have 
already been ruled against at every stage of this litigation, they can harass the court into some action 
in their favor. This is an unreasonable and potentially unethical misuse of the litigation process and 
Plaintiffs resources in having to respond. The Defendants' motion should be denied and attorney's 
fees should be awarded to Plaintiff as well as any sanctions found justified by the Court. 
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II. THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO RECONSIDER ITS RULING ON 
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The Defendants' request that the Court reconsider its ruling on the Defendants' summary 
judgment motion is not properly brought under Rule 52(b), which only addresses amendment of 
findings and judgment after a final order is entered. Instead, the Defendants' request that the Court 
review the denial of the summary judgment motion is a motion to reconsider that can only be brought 
under Rule 54(b). The Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this motion. 
A court may not reconsider its prior rulings on motions for summary judgment once a final 
judgment has been entered in a matter. As quoted above, Rule 54(b) has been found to give Utah 
courts jurisdiction to reconsider rulings on motions that dispose of less than the full matter before a 
court. However, once a final judgment is entered, a motion to reconsider the ruling on a prior 
summary judgment motion may not be entertained. As quoted above, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that "[w]hen summary judgment has been granted on some issues, but a final judgment in the 
case had not been entered, the summary judgment was subject to revision "under subdivision (b)": A 
motion to reconsider was a reasonable means of requesting such revision and was therefore 
permitted." Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993). This does not apply to the facts at hand. 
Further support for the fact that a motion to reconsider cannot be brought after entry of the 
final order is found in the case of Trembley v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. In Trembley, the Court of 
Appeals of Utah noted, "Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, however, allows a court to 
change its position with respect to any order or decision before a final judgment has been rendered in 
the case. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184-85 (Utah 1993); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah App.1988)." Trembley v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 
Page 12 of 16 
1306, 1310 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The court went on to state "a judge is free to change a ruling 
until a final decision is formally rendered. Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b); Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 
P.2d 650, 652-54 (Utah 1994); McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah App.1987); cf. 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977) ("[Generally preliminary or 
interim rulings do not rise to the dignity of res judicata or stare decisis.")." Trembley, 884 P.2d at 
1311. 
It is undisputed that the Court has entered a final judgment in this matter and it cannot be 
disputed that the Defendants1 request to revisit the summary judgment motion is a motion to 
reconsider. Nor can it be disputed that this is part and parcel of the lengths to which defendants will 
go to attempt to harass the court and plaintiff with this baseless motion. 
Based on the voluminous case law quoted above and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Court lost jurisdiction to revise its decision on the summary judgment motion when the final order 
was entered. Rule 52(b) limits review to the findings of fact and judgment that the Court has entered. 
Since there is no jurisdiction to reconsider the summary judgment motion, the Defendants' motion on 
this issue must be denied. 
III. THE COURT CORRECTLY EVALUATED THE TESTIMONY OF STERLING JONES 
AND SHOULD NOT AMEND ITS FINDINGS. 
The issue of credibility of witnesses is clearly committed to the discretion of the trial court. 
See, e.g., Glauser Storage, L.L.C. v. Smedley, 27 P.3d 565, 569 (Utah App. 200lXquoting Coalville 
City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (Utah Ct App.), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683 (Utah 1997)) 
("'Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence and 
1
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clearly erroneous[,] with due consideration given to the trial court to judge the credibility of 
witnesses."1). 
The issue of credibility as it arose in this matter is similar to the credibility issue in the case of 
Homer v. Smith. In the Homer case, the issue was also that of boundary by acquiescence or 
prescriptive easement. The Smiths attempted to rebut the arguments that either of these had been 
established by testifying that they had given permission to the other people to use their property. The 
people to whom the Smiths allegedly gave permission were dead. The Court of Appeals noted that 
"[The testimony regarding permission] was uncontroverted because the Deweys were no longer alive 
at the time of trial. In its written findings, however, the trial court stated that the Smiths' testimony 
was "self-serving and not believable in view of [the Smiths1] conduct, demeanor and substantive 
testimony during trial." Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah App. 1993). In evaluating this 
finding, the court went on to say that 
Clearly, the fact-finder is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses 
and is free to disbelieve their testimony, [citations omitted] The trial court did just 
that here, and we give due regard to the court's opportunity to judge the credibility 
of the witnesses, [citation omitted]. Moreover, the record reveals that the Smiths' 
testimony at trial concerning both the Deweys' and Homer's use was contradictory 
and inconsistent. We therefore uphold the trial court's finding as to the credibility 
of the Smiths' testimony. 
Id. 
Homer is on all fours with the matter at hand. The Court in this matter observed the testimony 
of Sterling Jones and compared it with and weighed it against the testimony of the other witnesses at 
trial. Mr. Jones testified to at least two alleged conversations where the only other person in the 
conversation, Charles Argyle, is dead. The Court evaluated all the facts presented at trial and made its 
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first Memorandum Decision. The Court then revisited its assessment of Sterling Jones' testimony 
when it ruled on the Defendants' objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. In 
particular, the Court found that Sterling Jones' testimony was "contrived and unconvincing" on at 
least one issue and, while making some adjustment to the wording of the findings of fact, did not alter 
its ultimate conclusions as to Mr. Jones' credibility. The testimony of Mr. Jones was contradictory to 
the testimony of other witnesses and his own wife testified that she could not remember or did not 
know when questioned about the pertinent alleged conversation. The Court has properly found the 
testimony to be unconvincing and should deny the Defendants' motion to amend its finding regarding 
Mr. Jones' testimony. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
This is the second time since trial that the Defendants have raised the same issues. The Court 
already denied many of these contentions after the Defendants raised them, in their Objection to the 
final order. Even those changes that were made to the Order upon Defendants objection were 
factually insignificant or irrelevant and in reality constituted nothing more than a continued waste of 
plaintiffs modest resources to deal with this matter. 
Furthermore, the Defendants have improperly sought to have the Court review its ruling on a 
summary judgment motion when it is well established that there is no jurisdiction under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure for such a review. 
Apparently, defendants just cannot face that fact that they were caught in a lie, and have 
repeatedly lost on the same arguments at every stage of this litigation, which fact should no longer be 
1
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brought to bear on Plaintiff who has been forced to incur additional attorney's fees and costs 
responding to these baseless or irrelevant motions. 
Therefore, Plaintiff requests that he be awarded $1000.00 for attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in responding to this motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendants' motion should be denied and Plaintiff should be 
awarded his attorney's fees and costs. 
Dated this 2 ^ day of JCJAMJA^*/) , 2004. 
JereyReneer 
JEER & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I^mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' RULE 52(b) MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT, on the lM of V l f l J l l / M ^ 2004, to the following: 
Patrick Ascione 
Justin Elswick 
2696 North University Ave, Suite 180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, UT 84604 
Legal Secretary 
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ADDENDUM 10 
PATRICK J. ASCIONE—6469 
JUSTIN D. HEIDEMAN—8897 
JUSTIN R. ELSWICK—9153 
Ascione & Heideman, L.L.C. 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 812-1000 
Fax:(801)374-1724 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER ARGYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STERLING D. JONES, DOROTHY P. 
JONES and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' AMENDED 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Case No. 010400893 
Division No. 9 
COME NOW the Defendants Sterling D. Jones and Dorothy P. Jones (hereinafter, 
"Defendants"), by and through their attorneys of record and answers the Plaintiffs Complaint as 
follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
(Failure to State a Claim) 
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 
1 
SECOND DEFENSE 
(Response to Specific Averments) 
Defendants respond to the specific numbered paragraphs of Plaintiff s Complaint and 
admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
1. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the truthfulness of the 
allegations contained in paragraph 1 of Plaintiff s Complaint, and therefore deny the same. 
2. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of Plaintiff s 
Complaint. 
3. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the truthfulness of the 
allegations contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiff s Complaint, and therefore deny the same. 
4. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of Plaintiff s 
Complaint. 
5. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
6. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
7. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
8. Defendants lack sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to the truthfulness of the 
allegations contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiff s Complaint, and therefore deny the same. 
9. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
3 
10. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiff s 
Complaint. 
11. In response to paragraph 11 of Plaintiff s Complaint, Defendants reallege by 
incorporation the denials and admissions in the preceding paragraphs. 
12. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of Plaintiff s 
Complaint. 
13. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of Plaintiff s 
Complaint. 
14. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of Plaintiff s 
Complaint. 
15. In response to paragraph 15 of Plaintiff s Complaint, Defendants reallege by 
incorporation the denials and admissions in the preceding paragraphs. 
16. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 16 of Plaintiff s 
Complaint. 
17. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 17 of Plaintiff s 
Complaint. 
18. Any and all allegations not specifically admitted to by Defendants are hereby 
expressly denied. 
4 
THIRD DEFENSE 
(Statute of Frauds) 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of frauds. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
(Statute of Adverse Possession) 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by failure to conform with and satisfy the requirements of the 
Utah statutes on adverse possession. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
(Estoppel) 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
(Latches) 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of latches. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
(Bad Faith and Unclean Hands) 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Plaintiffs bad faith and unclean hands. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
(Permissive Use) 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the fact that Plaintiffs use of the land was strictly 
permissive and does not give rise to any easement or right of interest in the property. 
5 
NINTH DEFENSE 
(Lack of Grounds for Easement) 
Plaintiffs claims have no grounds in Utah, federal, or common law allowing Plaintiff any 
basis to claim any right to an easement on the Property, since the Argyle family's use of the land 
was always permissive, did not entail any tax obligations, was not a conservation effort, and did 
not involve any necessity. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
(Defenses as Yet Undiscovered) 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by any and all other applicable defenses yet undiscovered by 
Defendants but which may be discovered hereafter. Defendants reserve the right to amend their 
Answer based on such as yet undiscovered defenses as they become apparent. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, 
that Plaintiff takes nothing thereby, that the Court award Defendants any and all costs incurred in 
defending this action, and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper 
under the circumstances. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Counterclaimants Sterling D. Jones and Dorothy P. Jones (hereinafter, "Jones") hereby 
assert the following counterclaims against Plaintiff Roger Argyle (hereinafter, "Argyle"), and for 
cause of action allege as follows: 
6 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. The real property at issue in this action (hereinafter, the "Property") is located in 
Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. On or about November 20,1882 the United States government granted to Jones' 
ancestor a land patent to the aforementioned Property. A copy of the land patent is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by reference as if folly set forth herein. 
3. The Property was owned by Jones' family until approximately 1961, when it was 
sold at a tax sale due to the owners' failure to pay property taxes on the Property. 
4. The owners of the Property had never received any tax notices from Utah County 
because the Utah County Recorder failed to identify the Property as being owned by the Jones' 
family. 
5. Defendant Sterling D. Jones purchased the Property at the tax sale despite the fact 
that the property actually originally belonged to his family. See copy of Tax Deed attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated by reference as if folly set forth herein. 
6. By 1961, Defendant Jones had already improved the Property by buying a well 
thereon. 
7. Subsequently, Defendant Jones graciously allowed Argyle's ancestor, Charlie 
Argyle, to use the Property for purposes of grazing livestock. 
7 
8. At the time that Jones allowed such use of the Property, Jones told Charlie Argyle 
that Jones had bought the Property at tax sale and was the lawful owner of the Property. 
9. At all times relevant hereto, Jones continued to maintain the fence on the 
Property, continued to use the well, and continued to regularly maintain the well. 
10. Since 1961 and at all times relevant hereto, Jones has paid all taxes assessed on 
the Property. 
11. At all times relevant hereto, Jones maintained and continues to maintain complete 
and exclusive control and use of a portion of the Property as a corn pit. 
12. Argyle's filing of the Complaint in this action against Jones demonstrates that it is 
no longer possible or feasible for Jones to continue to graciously allow Argyle's further use of 
the Property; therefore, Jones hereby revokes any permission previously granted to Charlie 
Argyle and/or his family, scions, and heirs which authorized their use of the Property. 
13. A Notice to Quit Premises has been served upon Argyle whereby Jones demands 
payment of rent for any use beyond the date specified therein, which rent shall be assessed at a 
rate of $ 1,000.00 per month. A copy of the Notice to Quit Premises is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C" and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 
14. If Argyle continues to occupy and/or use the Property beyond the date specified in 
the Notice to Quit Premises, he will have committed trespass, unlawful detainer, and conversion, 
and will be considered a holdover tenant under the laws of the State of Utah. 
8 
15. Counterclaimant Sterling D. Jones is currently in excess of 80 years of age and 
suffers from significant health problems, which require that he have peace and rest. 
16. Because of Counterclaimant Sterling D. Jones' health problems, Jones will hold 
Plaintiff responsible for any worsening of his health due to Plaintiffs actions. 
17. Jones hereby requests an injunction prohibiting Argyle from contacting Jones 
directly. 
18. Argyle's complaint is frivolous, without legal merit, and brought in bad faith, 
inasmuch as Utah law bars this claim from the outset; Counterclaimants are therefore entitled to 
an award of attorney fees incurred in defending against this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Waste) 
19. Defendants reallege and incorporate paragraphs 1-18 of the Counterclaim as though 
fully set forth herein. 
20. As required by Utah law, Defendants delivered to Plaintiff Argyle a Notice to Quit 
Premises on March 20, 2001. See, Exhibit "C." 
21. Plaintiff Argyle has not only failed to make quit the property, but has caused 
significant additional damage by depositing refuse on the land, by destroying wooden fences on 
the land, and by unearthing large sections of the grass to use as dirt pits and mounds for motor 
biking. 
9 
22. Plaintiff Argyle has committed this destruction since institution of the present legal 
action. Therefore, he has willfully and purposefully set about to ruin the property despite the fact 
that he knows that ownership of the property is currently disputed. 
23. Utah law recognizes actions for waste of property. 
24. Plaintiff has committed waste. 
25. Plaintiff has continued to holdover the property despite the fact that he received the 
aforementioned Notice to Quit. 
26. Plaintiffs destructive acts have damaged the interests of the Defendants. 
27. Therefore, Defendants are entitled to judgment against the Plaintiff for waste in an 
amount to be proven at trial but which amount will not be less than $7000.00. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants and Counterclaimants Sterling D. Jones and Dorothy P. 
Jones pray for judgment against Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Argyle as follows: 
1. For a declaratory judgment and findings of fact adjudging the following: 
(a) That Counterclaimants are the legal owners of record of the Property and 
entitled to the peaceful use, enjoyment, and seisen thereof; and 
(b) That Counterclaimant Defendant's assertions to title of the Property are 
without color, merit, or legal validity under the laws of the State of Utah 
and the government of the United States of America. 
10 
2. For an order granting Counterclaimants the continued exclusive, and peaceful 
right to use and enjoy the Property without further interference from the Counterclaim 
Defendant. 
3. For an order and judgment ordering Counterclaim Defendant to vacate the 
Property instantly and without delay, and to immediately remove therefrom all personal effects 
and/or property, and to restore the Property to the condition existing prior to the use of the land 
by Charlie Argyle. 
4. For an injunction prohibiting Counterclaim Defendant from directly contacting 
Counterclaimants and thereby aggravating the Counterclaimants' existing health problems. 
5. For judgment for the Counterclaimants and against the Counterclaim Defendant 
for waste in an amount to be proven at trial, but which amount will not be less than $7000,00. 
6. For an award of attorney fees incurred in defending against this action. 
7. For Counterclaimants' costs incurred. 
8. For any other and further relief as the Court deems just. 
DATED this (n day of June, 2002. 
Ascione & Heideman, L.L.C. 
Justin K. Elswick 
Attorney for Defendants 
Vu via R/ J\ ~C^j£", qJ^_ 
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EXHIBIT " 
i JL i U 
1.4X DEED 4/7*7.., 
# -
UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah, Grantor, hereby conveys 
survivorship 
to Ske£UBS.I>fMter<&^ , Grantee, of 
.., State of Utah, S&Mish.J.QXK : , 
the following described real estate in Utah County, State of Utah; 
, . Com. Il60 chs W of NE cor of SVf£ of Sec 15, T 8 S, R 2 E, SLBSM; S 2.50 chs; 
S15a E k chs; S k0° E 5-30 chs; N 71° E 2,75 chs; N 10° W 1&0 chs; N 3° E 
2.65 chs; N 2° W 1,35 chs; N &J° W 2.35 chs; S 57° W 2,23 chs; N 53° W 2.24 
l
»« chs; N 15° W 3.90 chs; W .28 chs to "beg. Area 3.32 acres. 
This conveyance is* made In consideration of payment by the Grantee of the sum of $_ 8.16 
delinquent taxes, penalties, Interest and costs constituting a charge against said real estate, which was sold to said 
County at preliminary sale for nonpayment of general taxes ossessed against It for the year 19. in the 
sum of $ _ J i i i £ 
Dated this P l r t h day of ^ , 1 S & 
Utah County, A Body Corporate and 
Politic of the State of Utah 
By ^AL&tft ±Mk 
' j f " v County Auditor 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Utah 
On this . 2*fth , day of - Way-
Lewis J. Harmer 
A. D. l?6l 
before me personally appeared 
who being by me first duly sworn on oath 
did say that he is the County Auditor of Utah County, State of Utah, and that the foregoing instrument was 
signed by him in behalf of said County\ and the said L e v i s J . H a r m e r 
County Auditor as aforesaid, acknowledj 
- n ~ - u j > C D 
the same. 
,^0 me that said Utoh County, a county of the State, of Utah, executed 
-t>rn>> -XD 
/ V • County. Recorder^, Utoh County 
:
~Z < /'"' V' I > V !; r' /;•*•„ p deputy 
EXHIBIT 
NOTICE TO QUIT PREMISES 
TO: ROGER ARGYLE 
HATE: March 20. 2001 
YOU ARE HEREBY ADVISED THAT YOU HAVE THREE (31 DAYS IN WHICH TO 
SURRENDER THE FOLLOWING PREMISES TO THEIR RIGHTFUL OWNER: 
Commencing 1160 chains West of the Northeast Corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 15, Township 8 
South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South 2.50 chains; thence South 15° East 4 
chains; thence South 40° East 5.30 chains; thence North 71 ° East 2.75 chains; thence North 10° West 150 
chains; thence North 3° East 2.65 chains; thence North 2° West 1.35 chains; thence North 67° West 2.35 
chains; thence South 57° West 2.23 chains; thence North 53° West 2.24 chains; thence North 15° West 3.90 
chains; thence West .28 chains to the point of beginning. Area 3.32 acres. 
Under Section 78-36-3 of the Utah Code, a tenant of real property for a term less than life is guilty of an 
unlawful detainer after default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in the 
alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, has remained uncomplied 
with for a period of three days after service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent 
becomes due. 
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING UTAH STATUTE CAREFULLY: 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent — Immediate enforcement — Treble 
damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment entered in favor of the 
plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided in Section 78-36-10.5. If the 
proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the 
lease or agreement under which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment 
shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall 
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved 
at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in the payment of rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the 
damages assessed under Subsections (2) (a) through (2) ( c \ and for reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of the rent, execution upon the 
judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be 
issued and enforced immediately. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Ascione,Jfejier, Noyes & Heideman, P.C. 
, "' EXHIBIT "C" 
Patrick J. Ascione 
Attorney for Sterling D. and Dorothy P. Jones 
Mailing Certificate 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Defendants' MOTION TO AMEND, with its 
accompanying MEMORANDUM and a copy of Defendants' AMENDED ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM was mailed by First Class U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, to the following on 
this jO day of June, 2002: 
Rodney W. Rivers 
Jeffs & Jeffs, P.C. 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 Qi^to^ 
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Ascione, Joner, Noyes & Heideman, P.C. 
2696 University Avenue, Suite 180 
P.O. Box 600 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone:(801) 812-1000 
Fax:(801)374-1724 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER ARGYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STERLING D. JONES, DOROTHY P. 
JONES, and JOHN DOES 1 - 5, 
Defendants. 
STERLING D. JONES and DOROTHY P. 
JONES, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
ROGER ARGYLE, 
Counterclaim Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF STERLING D. 
JONES IN SUPPORT OF THE 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 010400893 
Division No. 9 
COMES NOW Sterling D. Jones and, being first duly sworn upon his oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. The real property at issue in this action (hereinafter the "Property") is located in 
Utah County, State of Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing 11.60 chains West of the Northeast Corner of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 15, Township 8 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian; thence South 2.50 chains; thence South 15° East 4 chains; thence 
South 40° East 5.30 chains; thence North 71° East 2.75 chains; thence North 10° 
West 150 chains; thence North 3° East 2.65 chains; thence North 2° West 1.35 
chains; thence North 67° West 2.35 chains; thence South 57° West 2.23 chains; 
thence North 53° West 2.24 chains; thence North 15° West 3.90 chains; thence 
West .28 chains to the point of beginning. Area 3.32 acres. 
2. On or about November 20, 1882 the United States government granted to my 
ancestor a land patent to the aforementioned Property. 
3. Neither my ancestor nor myself ever received any tax notices from Utah 
County because the Utah County Recorder failed to identify the Property as being owned 
by my family. 
4. Long before 1961, my father, David H. Jones, had purchased a well and the 
accompanying water rights on the Property even though he did not know that he already 
might have had title to the property. 
5. Subsequently, Argyle's ancestor, Charlie Argyle, was allowed to use the 
Property for purposes of grazing livestock. 
^ 6. After an altercation with Charlie over the common property line, and following 
the re-location of the Lake Shore Canal, Charlie and I had words and we left with a 
decision to check our property descriptions and property lines. We never talked about it 
again. 
7. In checking my property description, I learned that the Property was omitted 
and was being sold at a tax sale. I purchased the Property and was issued a tax deed. 
Later, Charlie knew of it and I confirmed it. 
8. At all times relevant hereto, I continued to maintain the fence on the Property, 
continued to use the well, and continued to regularly maintain the well 
9. Since 1961 and at all times relevant hereto, I paid all taxes assessed against the 
Property. 
10. At all times relevant hereto, I maintained and continue to maintain complete 
and exclusive control and use of a portion of the Property as a corn pit. 
11. The Plaintiff has committed waste on the Property by damaging valuable 
grazing property through the use of all-terrain vehicles on the Property and by using the 
Property as a shooting range. 
12. Argyle's actions in filing the Complaint against me demonstrate that it is no 
longer possible or feasible for me to continue to act as a good neighbor and allow 
Argyle's further use of the Property; therefore, I have revoked any permission previously 
granted to Charlie Argyle and/or his family, scions, and heirs which authorized their 
temporary use of the Property. 
DATED this ^ ? ^ day of May, 2001. 
Sterling D. Jones, 
%Hltstf^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this j£L day of May, 2001 
v~* 
PATRICK J ASCIONE 
Notary Public 
State of Utah 
MyComm Exp'res Oct 3,2001 
p
 O -ox 600 Provo UT 84603 
•w » m w> 
PUBLIC 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
STERLING D. JONES IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was sent by first-class U.S. Mail, first-class, postage prepaid, 
t h i s j ^ d a y of May, 2001 to: 
Rodney W. Rivers, 
Jeffs & Jeffs, P.C. 
90 North 100 East 
PO Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On the day of October, 2004,1 caused to be delivered via the following 
method two copies of the foregoing to the following: 
Jere Reneer 
Lee Fisher 
RENEER & ASSOCIATES 
324 N. Main 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Telephone: 801-798-3574 
• U.S. Mail 
• Facsimile 
Ift Hand-Delivered 
• Federal Express 
